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ABSTRACT
Chen, Haining PhD, Purdue University, December 2017. Improving the Policy Speciﬁcation for Practical Access Control Systems. Major Professor: Ninghui Li.
Access control systems play a crucial role in protecting the security of information
systems by ensuring that only authorized users are granted access to sensitive resources,
and the protection is only as good as the access control policies. For enabling a security administrator to express her desired policy conveniently, it is paramount that a policy
speciﬁcation is expressive, comprehensible, and free of inconsistencies. In this dissertation, we study the policy speciﬁcations for three practical access control systems (i.e.,
obligation systems, ﬁrewalls, and Security-Enhanced Linux in Android) and improve their
expressiveness, comprehensibility, and consistency. First, we improve the expressiveness
of obligation policies for handling different types of obligations. We propose a language
for specifying obligations as well as an architecture for handling access control policies
with these obligations, by extending XACML (i.e., the de facto standard for specifying
access control policies). We also implement our design into a prototype system named
ExtXACML to handle various obligations. Second, we improve the comprehensibility of
ﬁrewall policies enabling administrators to better understand and manage the policies. We
introduce the tri-modularized design of ﬁrewall policies for elevating them from monolithic to modular. To support legacy ﬁrewall policies, we also deﬁne a ﬁve-step process and
present algorithms for converting them into their modularized form. Finally, we improve
the consistency of Security-Enhanced Linux in Android (SEAndroid) policies for reducing
the attack surface in Android systems. We propose a systematic approach as well as a semiautomatic tool for uncovering three classes of policy misconﬁgurations. We also analyze
SEAndroid policies from four Android versions and seven Android phone vendors, and in
all of them we observe examples of potential policy misconﬁgurations.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Access control systems play a crucial role in protecting the security of information systems
by ensuring that only authorized users are granted access to sensitive resources. Access
control systems appear in practical systems in many forms, from simple ﬁrewalls to more
complex Android OS. An access control system can be broadly viewed to be composed of
two critical components: a policy and a policy enforcement engine. Policy speciﬁcations
for access control systems are the subject of the investigation of this dissertation.
For enabling a security administrator to express her desired policy conveniently, it is
paramount that a policy speciﬁcation is expressive, comprehensible, and free of inconsistencies. The absence of any of the aforementioned desired properties hinders the security
assurance expected from an access control system. For instance, if a policy speciﬁcation
is not expressive enough, it may induce the situation where the administrator cannot express her desired policy to protect the system from imminent threat leaving the system
vulnerable. The objective of this dissertation is to aid the administrator’s responsibility of
policy speciﬁcation by contributing policy speciﬁcation enhancements and automated analysis tools. To this end, we study the policy speciﬁcations for three practical access control
systems (i.e., obligation systems, ﬁrewalls, and Security-Enhanced Linux in Android) and
improve their expressiveness, comprehensibility, and consistency.
• Expressiveness: whether an access control policy has a strong expressive power to
support different system components.

• Comprehensibility: whether an access control policy is easily understandable and
manageable.

• Consistency: whether access control policies across a system are consistent.
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1.1

Improving Expressiveness of Obligation Policies

Problem statement. How can we improve the expressiveness of obligation policies for
handling different types of obligations?
Motivation. Obligations are an important and indispensable part of many access control
policies, such as those in DRM (Digital Rights Management) and healthcare information
systems. For example, some policies permit resources to be accessed provided that the data
subjects whose data is accessed will be notiﬁed after the access, and some policies require
data to be deleted within some days of access.
A trend in access control is to use a common formal language for specifying access
control policies, so that separation of policy speciﬁcation from enforcement mechanism
can be better achieved, and the policy evaluation and enforcement mechanism can be reused
cross different systems. XACML is emerging as a de facto standard for specifying access
control policies in many settings.
To be able to use obligations in a real-world access control system, there must exist a language for specifying obligations. Such a language is currently lacking. Even
though XACML appears to make obligations an integral part of access control policies,
the XACML standard does not specify what an obligation element ought to contain and
how to handle it. The standard states that the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) should not
enforce the decision of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) if the decision is accompanied
by obligations that the PEP does not know how to handle. Without a common language
for specifying obligations, any policy that returns obligations simply causes the policy’s
decision to be ignored or contradicted by the PEP.
Contributions. In Chapter 4, we propose a concrete design to extend XACML with the
support of obligations for improving the expressiveness of obligation policies. In our design, we reuse the elements for rules in policies for rules in obligations. We have implemented our design into a prototype system named ExtXACML, based on SUN’s XACML
implementation [1].
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ExtXACML can handle access control policies with different kinds of obligations, including obligations before, during or after accesses to resources, obligations performed by
systems or users, and their combinations. Furthermore, ExtXACML is extensible in that
new obligation modules can be added into the system to handle various obligations for
different applications. All of these features show the strong power of our proposed design.

1.2

Improving Comprehensibility of Firewall Policies

Problem statement. How can we improve the comprehensibility of ﬁrewall policies for
better understanding and management?
Motivation. A ﬁrewall is among the ﬁrst lines of defenses for protecting a network (or, a
host) from malicious users. A ﬁrewall intercepts network packets, and based on a speciﬁc
ﬁrewall policy, decides whether to allow or deny certain packets to pass through it. As
ﬁrewalls are developed by many vendors (e.g., Cisco, Check Point), the syntaxes and semantics of ﬁrewall policy languages vary. However, at its core, most of the packet ﬁltering
rules expressed in these speciﬁcation languages can be translated into an access contro list
(ACL) representation.
Due to the dynamic nature of a network and its surrounding environment (e.g., addition
of new services, discovery of new attacks, a host becoming compromised), the ﬁrewall
policies must evolve over time, in order to maintain a robust defense against malicious
users while allowing legitimate trafﬁc. Hence, it is necessary for ﬁrewall policies to be
intellectually manageable. That is, administrators should be able to understand existing
policies, possibly designed either by other administrators or by the same administrator
over time. They should be able to modify a policy to achieve some intended objectives,
mentally assess what the policy does, and “debug” the policy when problems arise.
Regrettably, many ﬁrewall policies are not intellectually manageable. For instance, it
has been observed that most ﬁrewalls on the Internet are poorly designed and have many
conﬁguration errors in their rules [2, 3]. As ﬁrewalls can only be as effective as their con-
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ﬁguration, misconﬁgurations of ﬁrewalls undermine their intended purpose of protecting
the networks in question, causing ﬁrewalls to offer only a false sense of security.
We argue that policies expressed in ACL-based languages are monolithic. A monolithic
policy can only be understood as a whole. This becomes infeasible as the policy gets large,
since most people are unable to put a large amount of information in the working memory.
Contributions. In Chapter 5, we elevate ﬁrewall policies from monolithic to modular
for improving the comprehensibility of ﬁrewall policies. First, we recognize ﬁve requirements for a successful modularization approach (i.e., logical partitioning, isolation among
modules, ﬂexible partitioning structure, human-computable policy slicing, and readily deployability), and analyze existing approaches using these requirements to identify their
shortcomings.
Second, we introduce our approach of modularizing ﬁrewall policies. This includes
the concept of a primary attribute, which is either the source IP, the destination IP, or the
service. A policy is partitioned into three kinds of modules: primary modules, auxiliary
modules, and template modules. Beyond making policies more modular and easier to understand, our approach also supports policy refactoring, either by distilling templates from
recurring patterns, or by breaking up a large module into multiple smaller ones, each covering a subset of the IP range.
Third, to support legacy ﬁrewall policies, we have deﬁned a 5-step process and introduced algorithms for converting them into their modularized form. We have also implemented an automated tool called ModFP for this purpose.

1.3

Improving Consistency of SEAndroid Policies

Problem statement. How can we improve the consistency of SEAndroid policies for reducing the attack surface?
Motivation. Due to the popularity and its open-source nature, Android has received signiﬁcant attention from academic and industrial security researchers. Much of existing research into the security aspect of Android has focused on the middleware layer and its
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permission system [4, 5]. However, the middleware is only one part of the Android platform. Android is built on top of the Linux kernel, with a collection of traditional and
customized Linux libraries and daemons. While permission misconﬁgurations may lead
to apps gaining additional capabilities (e.g., reading geographic location), lower-level policy misconﬁgurations may lead to persistent ﬁrmware modiﬁcations that compromise the
device integrity.
Early versions of Android relied on Unix’s discretionary access control (DAC) mechanism to protect daemon-speciﬁc resources as well as to isolate apps from one another.
However, Unix’s DAC mechanism has limited expressiveness; for example, processes with
the same effective user ID are treated the same way. Furthermore, DAC’s discretionary
nature allows inadvertent or malicious policy modiﬁcation that violates the security goals
of the system. Therefore, Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [6], which adds mandatory
access control (MAC), has been integrated into Android to harden the security of the lower
layer of Android, resulting in Security-Enhanced Linux in Android (SEAndroid) [7].
SEAndroid is a port of SELinux to the Android platform. Its integration into the
Android Open Source Project (AOSP) has been an incremental process. SEAndroid enforcement was ﬁrst adopted in Android version 4.4, but with a minimally restrictive policy [8]. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Samsung and HTC have devoted signiﬁcant resources to customizing and enhancing SEAndroid policy for their devices. Through the efforts of these OEMs, the SEAndroid project, and Google, recent versions of Android now contain large and complex SEAndroid policies. Different versions
of Android and different OEMs have vastly different policy speciﬁcations. One main challenge is that there is no ground truth of correctness, and hence there is no clear “goodness”
metric to evaluate a given policy. Without a systematic way of policy analysis, SEAndroid
policies may consist of misconﬁgurations, which enlarge the attack surface and bring in
possibilities of new attacks.
Contributions. In Chapter 6, we propose to systematically analyze SEAndroid policies
via three analysis problems for improving the consistency of SEAndroid policies. We focus on identifying the following three classes of policy misconﬁgurations. (1) Composi-
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tional privilege escalation occurs when a subject gains elevated privilege due to the interaction of multiple rules; that is, a subject gains more privileges than the union of privileges
granted through each rule. (2) Critical types accessed by low-privileged domains occurs if
a security-critical object type can be accessed (read and/or write) by some low-privileged
domain. (3) Coarse granularity of types occurs when objects belonging to the same type
(and hence are protected the same way according to SEAndroid) have diverse protection
needs that the least-privilege protection cannot be achieved for all of them. These analysis
problems help identify concerns in SEAndroid policies and ways to enhance them.
Second, we implement a semi-automated tool for applying our approach to SEAndroid
policies. The tool collects necessary information and identiﬁes instances of the three classes
of policy misconﬁgurations.
Third, we apply our approach to analyze SEAndroid policies across various Android
versions and across different OEMs. Our ﬁndings can help policy writers better understand
and customize SEAndroid policies.

1.4

Organization
The organization of the dissertation is in the following. Chapter 2 overviews some basic

knowlege of access control including access control models and access control speciﬁcations. Relate work is discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present our work of extending XACML for supporting obligations. In Chapter 5, we propose a tri-modularization
design for ﬁrewall policies. We introduce a systematic approach to discover inconsistencies
in SEAndroid policies in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
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2. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we give an overview of some basic knowlege of access control, including
access control models and speciﬁcations.

2.1

Access Control Models
Many access control models have been designed over the last four decades, among

which three popular access control models widely used nowadays are discretionary access
control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC) which is also known as lattice-based access control (LBAC), and role-based access control (RBAC). In addition, there are emerging access control models such as attribute-based access control (ABAC). We discuss these
access control models in the following.

2.1.1

Discretionary Access Control

DAC is the key access control mechanism used in traditional Unix and Linux operating
systems. DAC policies control accesses (i.e., read, write, and execute) to objects (e.g.,
ﬁles, directories, and sockets) in a ﬁlesystem, based on the identity and groups of subjects.
An access control list can be deﬁned on an object to control which users can have what
permissions on the object. As DAC’s name suggests, it allows an object’s owner to grant
permissions to other users at the discretion of the owner.

2.1.2

Mandatory Access Control

Unlike DAC, MAC does not allow object owners to pass access permissions to others.
Instead, accesses to objects are controlled by policies deﬁned and enforced by the system.
Every subject or object is assigned a security label which includes a classiﬁcation (e.g.,
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unclassiﬁed, and top secret) and a category (e.g., nuclear, and crypto). A subject is allowed
to access an object if its security label matches the object’s security label.
Type enforcement [9] is a form of MAC. Each subject (process) or object (e.g., ﬁles
and sockets) is labeled with a type. Subject types are also called domains. Types (or
domains) can be grouped as attributes, the usage of which forms a hierarchy. For instance,
the appdomain attribute is assigned to app domains. Each object is also associated with
one or more classes predeﬁned by the system. A class can be regular ﬁle, directory, socket,
block ﬁle, character device, etc. Each class is associated with a ﬁxed set of permissions
(e.g., read, write, open, and execute), predeﬁned by the system. Whether a subject
can access an object depends on if the subject’s domain is allowed to access the type and
the class of the object.

2.1.3

Role-based Access Control

RBAC [10, 93] has been the most widely used and dominant access control paradigm
in both the research community and the industry. The essential concept in RBAC is roles,
which are created based on different functions such as students and professors. Permissions
to operate on resources are assigned to roles, and users are assigned particular roles. In this
way, users get permissions from the roles assigned to them. Roles can form a role hierarchy,
so inheritance is supported between roles.

2.1.4

Attribute-based Access Control

ABAC is increasingly being used in industry and studied in the research community
recently. It has been argued that ABAC is the next dominant access control model after
DAC, MAC, and RBAC. In ABAC, access control decisions are determined based on a set
of attributes associated with the request, the resource being access, and the environment.
The traditional access control models, such as DAC, MAC, and RBAC, can be viewed
as using a few model-speciﬁc attributes together with a few ﬁxed policy rules both for
deciding whether an access request is to be allowed or denied and for governing how these
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attributes may be initialized and changed. Attributes play a critical role in access control
models. For example, identity and access control list in DAC, security label (including
security level and compartments) in LBAC, role in RBAC, and many other properties of
users, subjects, objects and the system can all be expressed as attributes. However, most
previous access control models assume that the attributes needed in decision evaluations
have been provided and are ready to be used, and they do not have the ability to specify
policy rules governing how attributes can be retrieved and changed.
ABAC systems generalize the previous models in the following sense: instead of ﬁxing
the attributes and the policy rules that are to be used, ABAC provides the mechanisms
through which one can use new attributes and deﬁne new policy rules that are needed for a
given application domain. As such ABAC is in a sense a meta model that can be conﬁgured
to implement existing access control models.

2.2

Access Control Speciﬁcations
In the following, we describe two mechanisms to specify access control policies.

2.2.1

Access Control List

An access control list (ACL) in a ﬁlesystem is a list attached to an object containing
entries each of which deﬁnes the permissions of a subject on the object. In networking
systems, such as ﬁrewalls, routers and switchers, an ACL is an ordered list of rules to
decide whether to allow or deny certain packets to pass through a protected network. Each
rule has the form “target!action”, in which target speciﬁes a set of packets to which this

rule is applicable, and action states what should be done with the packet. More speciﬁcally,

a target of an ACL rule is a restriction on the values of the different packet header ﬁelds
(e.g., source IP address, destination IP address, destination port). In an ACL, multiple rules
can be applicable to a single packet and the decision of the ﬁrst rule that is applicable to
the packet is imposed on the packet. This is known as the “ﬁrst match semantics”.
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2.2.2

Extensible Access Control Markup Language

OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is emerging as a de
facto standard for specifying access control policies in many settings. Our descriptions are
based on XACML 2.0 [11], and the high-level ideas remain accurate for the current draft
of XACML 3.0 [12].
Rules, Policies, and Policy-sets. XACML deﬁnes three levels of policy elements: rules,
policies, and policy-sets. A rule is the most basic policy element; it has three main components: a target, a condition, and an effect. The target deﬁnes a set of subjects, resources and
actions that the rule applies to; the condition speciﬁes restrictions on the attributes in the
target and reﬁnes the applicability of the rule; the effect is either Permit, in which case
we call the rule a permit rule, or Deny, in which case we call it a deny rule. If a request
satisﬁes both the rule target and rule condition, the rule is applicable to the request and
yields the decision speciﬁed by the effect element together with a set of (possibly empty)
obligations and advice; otherwise, the rule is not applicable to the request and yields the
decision NotApplicable.
A policy consists of four main components: a target, a rule-combining algorithm
(RCA), a set of rules, and obligations. The policy target decides whether a request is applicable to the policy and it has a similar structure as the rule target. The RCA speciﬁes how
the decisions from the rules are combined to yield one decision. The obligations element
consists of a set of obligations, which represent functions to be executed in conjunction
with the enforcement of an authorization decision.
A policy-set also has four main components: a target, a policy-combining algorithm
(PCA), a set of sub-policies, and obligations. A sub-policy can be either a policy or a
policy-set. The PCA speciﬁes how the results of evaluating the sub-policies are combined
to yield one decision.
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In XACML, a rule, a policy, or a policy-set returns one of the following four decisions for each request: P (Permit), D (Deny), NA (NotApplicable), and IN
(Indeterminate). The value IN occurs when there is a policy evaluation error.
Policy Combining Algorithms.

XACML has six standard PCAs. They are “Deny-

overrides”, “Ordered-deny-overrides”, “Permit-overrides”, “Ordered-permit-overrides”,
“First-applicable” and “Only-one-applicable”.

Ordered-deny-overrides and ordered-

permit-overrides are the same as deny-overrides and permit-overrides, respectively, except
that rules and policies have to be evaluated in the order they appear.
XACML “Permit-overrides” PCA has the preference P > D > IN > NA. That is, when
any sub-policy permits the request, the policy as a whole permits it. When no sub-policy
permits the request, and at least one denies it, the policy as a whole denies it. Otherwise,
when there is an error somewhere, the policy reports error on the request. Otherwise, the
policy is non-applicable. The “Deny-overrides” PCA uses the preference D > P > NA; in
addition, it treats IN as always equivalent to D. That is, whenever a sub-policy returns IN,
the policy would return deny. The “First-applicable” PCA returns the effect of the ﬁrst
applicable sub-policy as the result if no errors occur. Whenever an error occurs, the policy
returns IN. The “Only-one-applicable” PCA returns the effect of the unique policy in the
policy-set that applies to the request. If there are more than one applicable policies, the
PCA reports the conﬂict by returning IN. Furthermore, if an error occurs during evaluation
of any policy, the PCA also returns IN.
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3. RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss related work about access control, and its application in different
areas such as obligation systems, ﬁrewalls, and Android.

3.1

Access Control in Obligation Systems
Various obligation concepts have been studied in literature, most of which focus on the-

oretical analysis. The UCONABC model ﬁrst introduced the notions of pre-obligation and
ongoing-obligation , respectively [13–16]. Katt et al. extended obligations in the UCON
model to inlude post-obligations. Bettini et al. [17–19] formalized obligations and investigated mechanisms for monitoring obligations. If obligations are not fulﬁlled, the system
will take compensatory actions, which range from decreasing the trustworthiness of the
user, replacing unfulﬁlled obligations with (perhaps more costly) alternatives, etc. Heimdall [20] is a prototype obligation monitoring platform which tracks the fulﬁllment of pending obligations. Its policy language xSPL supports time constraints in obligations. Irwin et
al. [21–23] introduced the notion of accountability of obligations, which analyzes whether
the reason that some obligations are not fulﬁlled is due to user negligence or insufﬁcient
authorization. Recently several policy languages have been proposed to support the speciﬁcation of obligations in security policies, such as XACML [11], EPAL [24], KAoS [25],
Ponder [26] and Rei [27].
Our approach differs from these prior approaches in the following ways. First, our
model of an obligation as a state machine interacting with the outside world through events
is more powerful and expressive. In existing work, an obligation speciﬁes that on some
condition one event ought to happen, which is typically a certain subject must perform a
certain action. It is satisﬁed if that single event occurs, and violated otherwise. Our model
allows an obligation to specify that certain sequences of events must occur, with possibly
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different timing constraints for these events, and with later events possibly dependent upon
earlier ones. Our model also allows an obligation to generate events that cause external
effect during the lifecycle of the obligation, allowing, for example, sending a reminder
when certain actions have not occurred by certain times. Second, we examine the intricate
interactions between obligation status and the decision on a request and allow obligations
to affect the PEP’s decision in any desirable way. Finally, we introduce an extensible
architecture to enforce obligations. This includes an XML-based speciﬁcation language for
obligations, and a prototype implementation of PEP’s obligation handling functionalities.
Zhang et al. [16] and Katt et al. [28] also use state machines to model obligation enforcement. However, they use a state machine to model the behaviors of the PEP, rather
than individual obligations. In their model, each obligation still speciﬁes a single desired
event. In our approach, the state of the PEP is modeled implicitly in the algorithm the PEP
uses to handle requests and obligations.
Lischka [29] proposes XOML (eXtensible Obligation Markup Language), which allows
users to dynamically deﬁne and negotiate obligations between the PDP and the PEP in a
distributed environment. Obligations speciﬁed in this language have a unique obligation Id
and a list of parameters. This goes one step beyond XACML’s current approach of treating
an obligation as a blackbox; however, such obligations still cannot be enforced by the PEP.

3.2

Access Control in Firewall Systems
Wool [2, 3] studied errors in real-world Firewall policies. They deﬁne certain charac-

teristics as conﬁguration errors and found that the number of errors in a policy is correlated
with the number of rules in a policy. 36 such characteristics are used in [3], including “to
any address allow any service” rules, outbound “any” service rules, inbound or outbound
instance messaging rules, and so on. While our experience also shows that ﬁrewall policies
contain many errors, we point out that most of these “conﬁguration errors” as deﬁned in [3]
are really irregularities. They may indicate an error, but could also be intended by administrators for some speciﬁc reasons. This indicates a fundamental challenge in dealing with
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ﬁrewall conﬁguration errors. Without knowing the original intention of the administrators,
it is often impossible to tell whether something in a policy is a feature or a bug.
Analysis and Testing Tools. One line of research aims to identify anomalies in ﬁrewall
policies [30–36], either in a single policy, or in multiple policies placed on a network.
Algorithms and tools were developed to detect anomalies and recommend how they can
be ﬁxed. Such techniques resemble static analysis tools for detecting bugs in software
programs. They can detect errors manifested as anomalies, but not logical bugs where the
policy does not implement what the administrators intend to enforce.
Another approach to deal with ﬁrewall policy errors is to develop debugging tools.
Some tools generate and send testing packets and check whether they can go through ﬁrewalls. Other tools model ﬁrewalls using some formal modeling tools (often decision diagrams) and allow administrators to query the policy model [37–44]. For example, one can
issue queries such as “Which hosts can access the web server at 10.10.2.3?”. With these
techniques, administrators need to come up with appropriate queries that provide sufﬁcient
coverage and expected answers for these queries.
Several other interesting approaches have been proposed. One is change-impact analysis [45], which takes as input a ﬁrewall policy and a proposed change, and outputs the
impact of applying the change, such as what packets will have their decisions reversed.
Another is classifying the hosts of a network into equivalence classes [46]. Two hosts are
equivalent if after changing a packet’s source (similarly for destination) IP address from
one to the other, the decision remains the same. Techniques to automatically correct errors
in ﬁrewall policies, when a number of test cases (i.e., packets and the corresponding correct
decisions) are given as input, were developed in [47].
Like the case of software development, static analysis and debugging tools are valuable; however, they cannot fully mitigate the problem caused by a primitive programming
language lacking support for abstractions and modularization. Our approach aims at introducing such support.
Automatic policy generation. Instead of specifying ﬁrewall policies, in [48], a method is
proposed to discover ﬁrewall policy rules by ﬁrst mining the network trafﬁc log using asso-
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ciation rule mining, then aggregating the resulting rules, and ﬁnally detecting and removing
anomalies in the policy using techniques in [33]. In [49], an architecture is proposed for
automatically generating conﬂict-free ﬁrewall rules with alert information from network
and system logs in multiple-ﬁrewall scenarios.
Policy representation. A method to convert an ACL rule list to a textual representation
was proposed in [50]. The method ﬁrst aggregates rules that are similar (e.g., they differ
only in one ﬁeld) together, and then translate them into text. For example, it may produce a
rule that reads: “accept all TCP trafﬁc from address 140.192.37.⇤ and {to port 80 or to port
21}”. A similar approach was proposed by Tongaonkar et al. [51], in which given a ﬁrewall
policy, they ﬁrst ﬂatten the policy rules into non-overlapping ones using Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG), so that the order of the rules does not affect the policy semantic. Then they
merge similar rules to make compound rules such that a complexity metric is minimized.
This kind of methods are beneﬁcial to represent legacy policies in a more compact and
understandable ﬂavor.
Bartal et al. [52] develop a workﬂow for specifying ﬁrewall policies which proceeds in
three stages: (i) abstract policy speciﬁcation, (ii) policy instantiation, and (iii) automatic
rule generation. They also develop a rule illustrator that visualizes which trafﬁc between
any two hosts are allowed. Their workﬂow is suitable for a new organization which is
setting up their network instead of improving the manageability of legacy ﬁrewall policy.
Most commercial ﬁrewall policy languages or tools provide similar textual or graphicalbased interface, as well as the ability of deﬁning objects that can group multiple hosts into
a group, and use these groups in a policy. This provides the functionality of macros at the
level of individual ﬁelds in ﬁrewall policies.
Several efforts exist to specify ﬁrewall policies over packet ﬂows between two ranges
of IP addresses (which can be implemented by multiple ﬁrewalls that are in between the
source and destination networks). One example is a ﬁrewall speciﬁcation language for
Linux netﬁlter introduced in [53].
In summary, the languages discussed above provide three kinds of abstractions: (1)
named objects that group related IP addresses or port numbers together, similar to macros;
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(2) deﬁning policies in a global network view instead of the view of a single ﬁrewall; and
(3) syntactic sugars, e.g., making the rules more like a natural language description. These
are orthogonal to the kinds of abstractions we introduce for modularization.
An alternate way of representing ﬁrewall policies is by ﬁrewall decision diagram
(FDD) [54, 55]. An FDD is a decision diagram where nodes are divided into levels, with
each level corresponding to one ﬁeld in a packet. This method is, of course, drastically
different from using ACLs. It is unclear whether a policy speciﬁed in this form is easier to
understand or modify for an administrator.
Policy chains/subroutines. The concepts of policy chains and subroutines exist in ﬁrewall
products such as Linux netﬁlter [56] and SRX series ﬁrewalls by Juniper [57]. A sequence
of rules can be organized into a subroutine and can be invoked from multiple places. This
can improve the understandability of policies, especially when the same requirements are
repeatedly applied, e.g., the same sequence of rules are applied to multiple hosts.
This, however, does not provide the full advantage of modularization. There is no
isolation among subroutines and the full policy, or among different chains speciﬁcally in
netﬁlter. Policy chains and subroutines provide the mechanical support for modularization,
without the methodology on how to modularize a policy. If one simply divides a long
sequence of rules into multiple smaller ones that are chained together, that does not make
the policy easier to understand.
Only-one-accept modules. In [58], a notion of modular ﬁrewall policy was introduced,
where a policy is considered modular if it can be partitioned into multiple policy components M1 , . . . , Mr such that each packet is accepted by at most one component. In such an
approach, a packet is accepted by the overall policy only if it is accepted by one component,
and is denied otherwise. This approach is still inherently monolithic because of interactions
among different components. As conﬂicts are still allowed, for example, one module may
reject a packet whereas another module may allow it, when trying to understand the decision for a packet, one may still need to examine all components of a policy. There is also
no logical basis for partitioning a policy into different modules. Finally, determining the
slice of a policy, with respect to a speciﬁc packet or packet space, is not easier than in ACL.
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3.3

Access Control in Android Systems

Policy Analysis. The research community has investigated a wide range of topics about
SELinux policies, including policy speciﬁcation and analysis [59–62], integrity analysis
and veriﬁcation [63–65], attack surface analysis [66, 67], policy conﬂict resolution [68],
and visualized-based policy analysis [69, 70]. Eaman et al. [71] present a general survey. The techniques of SELinux policy analysis proposed in the above literature may
be applied to SEAndroid policies, but it is also worthwhile analyzing SEAndroid policies with Android speciﬁc knowledge. In [72], the authors analyze SEAndroid policies
from several Android 5.0 devices from different OEMs, and present common problems of
these OEM policies, including overuse of default types (e.g., unlabeled, device, and
system_data_file), overuse of predeﬁned domains (e.g., system_app), forgotten
or seemingly useless rules, and potentially dangerous rules. The authors also identify a
number of practical tools that may help analyze and improve SEAndroid policies, and implement a tool called SEAL [73]. However, this work does not provide a systematic way
to analyze an SEAndroid policy, and it requires a lot of work for manually checking the
analysis results. Also, this work is about analyzing SEAndroid MAC policies, while our
approach combines both MAC and DAC policies for analysis.
There are existing tools for analyzing SELinux/SEAndroid policies. SETools is a collection of graphical tools, command-line tools, and libraries designed to facilitate SELinux
policy analysis [74]. SETools is implemented for SELinux policies, but it can also be used
for SEAndroid policies. Although SETools is powerful, its analysis is largely syntactic.
For example, sediff (part of SETools) only lists differences between elements (e.g., types,
attributes, allow rules) of policies. SELinux Policy Analysis Notebook (SPAN) [75] is a
library to support using SETools in a Jupyter notebook. It provides an interactive environment which allows users to write text and python scripts at the same time for policy analysis. SEAL [73] is an SEAndroid live device analysis tool that can perform policy analysis
on Android devices (real or emulated) connected through ADB. It provides functionalities like listing policy statistics and listing ﬁles that a given process can assess. Currently
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SEAL is very preliminary. SPAN and SEAL are implemented on top of SETools, and they
are primarily frameworks for making policy queries. In contrast, we propose methods of
identifying potential policy misconﬁgurations. The authors of SEAL also provide SELint,
which aims to perform different checks on a policy [76]. Policy checks are implemented as
plugins, so they are extensible. Currently SELint supports three plugins for policy analysis:
risky_rules for scoring the riskness of rules, user_neverallow for checking if user-deﬁned
neverallow are obeyed by rules, and unnecessary_rules for (1) checking if there are miss-

ing rules in an ordered tuple of rules (e.g., type transition rules), (2) ﬁnding any rules of
debug types deﬁned by users, and (3) detecting if any necessary required permissions are
missing when a rule grants permissions over a class. A key limitation of the risky_rules
plugin is that it requires users to provide risk or trust scores for different domains and types,
which puts a burden on users as it requires a great deal of domain knowlege.
In [77], the authors use differential analysis techniques to detect inconsistencies in security conﬁgurations introduced by Android customization. This work mainly analyzes
conﬁguration ﬁles such as Android framework resource ﬁles and preload apps’ manifest
ﬁles, while our approach focuses on analyzing SEAndroid and DAC policies.
Policy Generation and Reﬁnement. There is a line of research on the generation and
reﬁnement of SEAndroid policies. Polgen is a tool for generating SELinux policies based
on system call traces [78]. A tool named “audit2allow” is widely used to generate SELinux
allow rules from logs of denied operations [79]. This tool is convenient to generate allow

rules for enabling new features to function correctly, but the resulting rules are not necessarily to be correct. EASEAndroid [80] is proposed to reﬁne SEAndroid policies based
on analyzing audit logs using machine learning techniques. SPOKE [81] is a tool for extracting domain knowledge from functional tests. The extracted domain knowledge will be
further used to characterize the attack surface of SEAndroid policies. This line of research
is orthogonal to our work in Chapter 6.
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4. ON PRACTICAL SPECIFICATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
OBLIGATIONS
Obligations are an important and indispensable part of many access control policies, such
as those in DRM (Digital Rights Management) and healthcare information systems. To
be able use obligations in a real-world access control system, there must exist a language
for specifying obligations. However, such a language is currently lacking. XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language), the current de facto standard for specifying
access control policies, seems to integrate obligations as a part of it, but it treats obligations
largely as black boxes, without specifying what an obligation should include and how to
handle them. In this chapter we examine the challenges in designing a practical approach
for specifying and handling obligations, and then propose a language for specifying obligations, and an architecture for handling access control policies with these obligations,
extending XACML’s speciﬁcation and architecture. In our design, obligations are modeled as state machines which communicate with the access control system and the outside
world via events. We further implement our design into a prototype system named ExtXACML, based on SUN’s XACML implementation. ExtXACML is extensible in that new
obligation modules can be added into the system to handle various obligations for different
applications, which shows the strong power of our design.

4.1

Introduction
Obligations are an important part of many access control policies. For example, some

policies permit resources to be accessed provided that the data subjects whose data is accessed will be notiﬁed after the access, and some policies require data to be deleted within
some days of access.
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A trend in access control is to use a common formal language for specifying access
control policies, so that separation of policy speciﬁcation from enforcement mechanism
can be better achieved, and the policy evaluation and enforcement mechanism can be reused
cross different systems. XACML is emerging as a de facto standard for specifying access
control policies in many settings.
To be able to use obligations in a real-world access control system, there must exist a language for specifying obligations. Such a language is currently lacking. Even
though XACML appears to make obligations an integral part of access control policies,
the XACML standard does not specify what an obligation element ought to contain and
how to handle it. The standard states that the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) should not
enforce the decision of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) if the decision is accompanied
by obligations that the PEP does not know how to handle. Without a common language
for specifying obligations, any policy that returns obligations simply causes the policy’s
decision to be ignored or contradicted by the PEP.
Our work in this chapter aims at developing a language for specifying obligations and
an architecture that extends the XACML architecture for handling access control policies
with these obligations. Integrating obligations in the processing of access control presents
several challenges that have not been adequately addressed in the literature.
First, many types of obligations exist, and one cannot anticipate all types of obligations
when designing the language to specify obligations; thus, the design must be extensible to
support new types of obligations. Second, failures in discharging some obligations may
affect the decision the PEP makes on a request, causing the PEP to deny the request even
when the PDP returns a Permit decision for the request. Third, the PEP’s decision may
in turn affect which obligations should be carried out. This mutual interaction between
obligations and PEP decisions must be carefully thought out.
We examine these issues and introduce a design that meets these challenges. We choose
a simple yet extensible architecture, allowing new types of obligations to be added by
adding appropriate system components for handling particular types of messages. Our key
ideas are as follows. We model an obligation as a state machine that communicates with the
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PEP using events. The PEP manages the lifecycle of obligations. An obligation includes
rulesets to specify its responses to input events. These responses include changing its
state in response to events, which informs the PEP about what course of actions it should
take regarding the request, and generating events, which inform the environment about
what actions must be taken to fulﬁll the obligation. Some of these actions are deployment
speciﬁc, and such actions are implemented by obligation modules. Multiple obligation
modules can be attached to the PEP, each implementing some actions. These obligation
modules communicate with the PEP and the obligations through an event interface.
We come up with a concrete design to extend XACML with support for obligations.
In our design, we reuse the elements for rules in policies for rules in obligations. We
have implemented our design into a prototype system named ExtXACML, based on SUN’s
XACML implementation [1]. ExtXACML consists of a PDP, a PEP, a Timer, an Access
Management Interface (AMI), and different obligation modules. Among these components,
the PDP and the PEP are deployment-independent, while the AMI and the obligation modules are application-speciﬁc. Thus we implemented the AMI and the obligation modules
for a speciﬁc application shown in Section 4.5.1. ExtXACML can handle access control
policies with different kinds of obligations, including obligations before, during or after
accesses to resources, obligations performed by systems or users, and their combinations.
Furthermore, ExtXACML is extensible in that new obligation modules can be added into
the system to handle various obligations for different applications. All of these features
show the strong power of our proposed design.

4.2

Overview of Obligation Handling in XACML
In this section, we brieﬂy describe how XACML handles policy combining and obli-

gations. Our descriptions are based on XACML 2.0 [11], and the high-level ideas remain
accurate for the current draft of XACML 3.0 [12].
An obligation in XACML has two required attributes: ObligationID and FulﬁllOn. In
addition, an obligation may have other attribute assignments, which the PEP is supposed to
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interpret. The FulﬁllOn attribute takes value of either Permit or Deny. When combining
sub-policies, one also needs to determine how the obligations with these sub-policies are
combined. XACML 2.0 handles obligations as follows [11].
A policy or policy set may contain one or more obligations. When such a policy
or policy set is evaluated, an obligation SHALL be passed up to the next level
of evaluation (the enclosing or referencing policy, policy set or authorization
decision) only if the effect of the policy or policy set being evaluated matches
the value of the FulﬁllOn attribute of the obligation.
In other words, an obligation will be returned by the PDP if it is associated with a policy
whose decision contributes to the ﬁnal decision made by the PDP, and the obligation’s
FulﬁllOn attribute equals the ﬁnal decision.

4.3

Complexities in Obligations Speciﬁcation and Handling
Designing a language for specifying obligations is challenging, because one needs to

support multiple types of obligations, and because one has to consider issues such as what
to do if processing an obligation fails, and what happens when the PEP makes a decision
that is different from the PDP’s decision. In this section, we explore these complexities.

4.3.1

Different Types of Obligations

There are different types of obligations. Based on when the actions required by an obligation must be performed relative to the actual access of resources, the UCONABC model
introduced the concepts of pre-obligation, and ongoing-obligation [13–15]. Another type
of obligations which is not included in the UCON model is post-obligation.
Perhaps the most common type of obligations is that of post-obligations, which specify
actions required to be performed after accesses to resources have occurred. Such postobligations have been widely considered in many areas such as Digital Rights Management
(DRM) system, healthcare information system, etc. For example, a policy in a healthcare
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information system may require that a patient record be deleted within 30 days after a
treatment. A member of an online music store has to pay monthly metered payment at the
end of each month for continuous music services.
Pre-obligations are obligations that should be fulﬁlled before the usage of resources is
allowed. An example is that whoever wants to access a digital library has to provide his or
her name and email address. In this case, if the user fails to fulﬁll the obligation to provide
sufﬁcient information, he or she will be denied to access the digital library.
Ongoing-obligations need to be fulﬁlled during the usage of resources. One example is
to require a user to keep certain advertising windows open while accessing some service.
The user may be allowed to access the service in the beginning, but if the user fails to fulﬁll
the ongoing-obligation, the service will be terminated.
There also exist obligations that do not naturally fall in the taxonomy of pre-, post-, and
ongoing- obligations. An example that has both pre- and post- component is to require a
user to agree to provide usage log information before listening to some music, and to report
the usage log after listening.
Some obligations may be required even when a request is to be denied, and there is no
access. For example, a security management policy may specify that a denied request is
considered to be a security violation, and hence auditing and logging must be performed.
Obligations may also be useful when the policy evaluation encounters an error. For
example, evaluating a policy may encounter an error because some important attribute is
lacking, and the policy evaluation result should notify the user to provide the required
information. Obligation is a natural mean for such purpose.
A language for obligations should support all these different usages of obligations.

4.3.2

Interactions

In addition to different timings of enforcement, obligations also differ in that the required actions need to be performed by different subjects. Some actions, such as logging
and notiﬁcation, can be performed by the access control component with simple extensions.
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Other actions can be performed only by other components of the system, such as those requiring data to be removed after a certain period of time. Other actions must be performed
by users. For instance, a patient must agree on the consent of an operation before the doctor
is allowed to perform the operation.
We thus separate the Access Control Component (ACC) from the rest of the system,
which we call the External Environment (EE). We now consider what kinds of interaction
between the ACC and the EE are needed. At a basic level, for each access request there
needs to be one round-trip communication between the EE and the ACC. When encountering an access request, the EE gives control to the ACC, which will make the decision
whether the request should be authorized. The ACC should then inform the EE about the
decision. The existence of obligations, however, causes this interaction between the ACC
and the environment to be more complex.
While some obligations can be fulﬁlled by the ACC, many obligations cannot, and
require the EE to perform some actions. Besides, the ACC needs to know whether the
obligations are fulﬁlled to make decisions on permitting the request or not. Consider a preobligation example, in which the user must accept a license agreement before being allowed
to access. In this example, the ACC has to wait for events from the EE’s user-interface
component to know whether the required action has been performed. Besides, such events
may occur in an asynchronous fashion. In other words, the existence of obligations forces
the ACC to have more complicated, often asynchronous communications with the EE.
Supporting the full life cycle of obligations also raises challenges, as the lifetime of
obligations may be much longer than that of accesses. Some obligations may require actions to be performed long after the access has taken place. Examples include requiring
data subjects to be notiﬁed after data has been accessed within 30 days of the access, requiring data to be deleted within a certain timeframe, and so on. The policy may also
require followup actions to take place when these obligations are violated. To support
these obligations, the system needs to monitor events regarding these obligations and to
record whether these obligations are fulﬁlled or violated.
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4.3.3

How Obligations Affect the PEP Decisions

When the PDP returns a decision together with obligations, the PEP does not always
follow the same decision as the PDP. The PEP’s decision on a request will be affected by
the obligations. More speciﬁcally, the PEP’s decision can be affected by whether the PEP
understands the obligations or not, and whether the attempt to fulﬁll the obligation succeeds
or not.
To illustrate the potential pitfalls in such interactions, we ﬁrst examine XACML’s design. XACML has three kinds of PEPs: Base PEP, Deny-Biased PEP, and Permit-biased
PEP. Their behavior, inferred from the XACML standard, is summarized in Table 4.1.
Some behaviors in Table 4.1 can be quite surprising. For example, both a Base PEP
and a Permit-biased PEP will permit a request when the PDP returns Deny accompanied
by obligations that the PEP does not understand or is unwilling or unable to discharge. This
is inferred from the following description in Section 7.1.1 of XACML 2.0 and Section 7.2
of XACML 3.0.
If the decision is “Deny", then the PEP SHALL deny access. If obligations
accompany the decision, then the PEP shall deny access only if it understands,
and it can and will discharge those obligations.
We ﬁnd the behavior of a base PEP permitting a request when the PDP returns Deny
rather disturbing. First, this violates the “Fail-safe Default” principle [82], which says
that a protection mechanism should deny access by default, and grant access only when
explicit permission exists. Second, this also violates the “Psychological Acceptability”
principle [82]. We believe the majority of policy authors do not anticipate that the inability
to discharge an obligation associated with a “Deny” decision will cause the request to be
permitted. Third, as there is no clear way to predict whether a PEP “can and will” discharge
all obligations, this makes the outcome of access control policies rather unpredictable. Furthermore, this may prove to be a loophole exploitable by an adversary. If an adversary can
create errors causing a PEP to fail to discharge an obligation, the adversary can potentially
gain access. For example, suppose that a policy says that an access should be denied with

Table 4.1.: PEP behaviors in XACML
PDP decision
Base PEP
Deny-Biased PEP
Permit-Biased PEP

Permit
(will discharge
obligations)
Permit
Permit
Permit

Permit
(cannot discharge
obligations)
Deny
Deny
Permit

Deny
(will discharge
obligations)
Deny
Deny
Deny

Deny
(cannot discharge
obligations)
Permit
Deny
Permit

Not
Applicable

Indeterminate

undeﬁned
Deny
Permit

undeﬁned
Deny
Permit
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an obligation to notify the system administrator about the access via email (perhaps because
the access indicates active intrusions), and the adversary can cause the email mechanism to
fail, the adversary may be able to gain access.
Along these arguments, Deny-biased PEP appears the only reasonable choice. We point
out that if one wants to enforce a policy that permits all requests unless a particular policyset S 1 denies it, one can still achieve this goal under a Deny-biased PEP, by wrapping ﬁrst
S 1 and then a policy that permits all requests in another policy set that uses First-Applicable
PCA. Hence using only Deny-biased PEP will not reduce the overall expressive power.
In summary, we believe that while the inability to fulﬁll obligations can cause the PEP
to reach a decision different from the PDP’s decision, the only allowable change of decision
is from a Permit to Deny.
We also observe that the requirement that the PEP follows the PDP’s decision only if
the PEP “understands, and can and will discharge those obligations” requires more clariﬁcations. Does this mean that the PEP must wait until the obligations are either fulﬁlled
or violated to make its decision, or that the PEP can decide so long as it knows how to
discharge the obligations (but the process of discharging the obligation may still fail)?
We believe the right answer is “it depends”. Some obligations must be fulﬁlled before
the decision is returned; for example, a request may be authorized only if the user has ﬁrst
completed a registration step. Some obligations only need to be processed after the decision
has been made and the requested access has occurred. Consider, for example, an obligation
that requires the system to log the duration of the access afterwards. The action cannot be
carried out before the request is permitted. Suppose that after the access, the system fails
to log, either because of failure in obtaining the necessary information or because of failure
in writing the log (e.g., the storage device becomes full). From the policy’s point of view,
the obligation is not discharged and should be recorded as such; however, the request is
permitted rather than denied.
In summary, there are different kinds of obligations, some should be processed before
the request can be permitted, and failure to fulﬁll them means the decision should change
from Permit to Deny. For other obligations, their fulﬁllment does not affect the decision

28
of the request. A policy language for specifying obligations should be able to allow all
these possibilities.

4.3.4

Which Obligations to Discharge

In XACML, obligations can be FulﬁllOn Permit or Deny. However, the decisions of
PDP and PEP are not always the same. Hence it is not obvious what obligations need to be
discharged. For example, suppose that the PDP returns Permit, together with several
obligations that are FulﬁllOn Permit, and the PEP is unable to discharge one of the
obligations, either because the PEP does not understand some parts of the obligation or
because the processing of the obligation results in an error. As a result, the PEP needs to
deny the request. In this situation, several questions naturally arise.
If the PEP needs to deny the request, should the other obligations that are fulﬁlled on
Permit be processed? One may argue “Yes” because the PDP’s decision is Permit.
One may also argue “No” because the PEP’s decision is Deny rather than Permit. The
answer to this question is not speciﬁed in XACML. We believe that the correct answer is
that it depends. It is plausible that some obligations should still be processed because the
PDP has decided to authorize the request, which may be a sufﬁcient condition to trigger the
obligations. It is equally plausible that some obligations no longer need to be processed,
because the PEP will deny the request due to the failure in obligation processing.
If the PEP needs to deny the request, should obligations that are fulﬁlled on Deny be
processed? In XACML, these obligations are not returned by the PDP to the PEP, because
the PDP’s decision is Permit; hence the PEP will not see these obligations and thus cannot
process them. However, one may argue that it is desirable that certain obligations must be
performed whenever an access is denied, no matter what reasons caused the deny to occur.
Hence our answer to the question is again that it depends. Some deny-related obligations
do not need to be processed because the PDP does not decide to deny the request. Others
need to be processed because the PEP will deny the request. The language should meet the
needs of ﬂexibilities.
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4.3.5

Which Obligations to Return

Obligations are included in policies, which are evaluated by the PDP. Given a request,
the PDP computes a decision and associated obligations. How to determine which obligations should be returned is a non-trivial question. XACML has obligations that are fulﬁlled
either on Permit or on Deny. Furthermore, all obligations that are returned by the PDP
are treated as mandatory, i.e., the PEP must handle all obligations. We raise the following
questions regarding this design.
Should there be optional obligations? In XACML, all obligations that are returned by
the PDP are mandatory. However, one may want to use obligations to specify actions that
are desirable, but not essential. For example, certain logging may be desirable, but can be
omitted when the system is under a heavy-load. XACML 3.0 has a concept called advices,
which appear to be optional obligations.
Should there be obligations that are fulﬁlled on Indeterminate? In XACML,
obligations are FulﬁllOn either Permit or Deny.

However, a PDP may return

Indeterminate, to indicate an error during policy evaluation. Different kinds of errors
may require different actions to be taken by the requester (e.g., in case of missing attribute
information) or by the system administrator (e.g., in case of policy errors). Obligations are
the natural mean to serve this need. Currently, XACML uses Status for dealing with errors.
However, the Status element simply shows the error information in a text fashion, without
the ability to inform different entities the need for more actions.
Should there be obligations that are fulﬁlled on applicable? Some policies may want
certain obligations (such as logging) fulﬁlled so long as the policy is found applicable to a
request, no matter whether the ﬁnal decision is Permit or Deny. For example, so long
as there is an attempt to access some private information, such as medical information or
credit history information, it may be desirable that the data subject be notiﬁed and that the
attempt be logged. For this purpose, we need obligations that must be discharged whenever
a policy’s target matches the request.
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4.4

Design of Obligation Speciﬁcation and Processing
We have examined the diverse kinds of obligations. A language for specifying obliga-

tions should be able to handle all these diversities without presenting an overly complex
design that confuses policy authors who need to specify obligations. In this section, we
present our design for specifying obligations and handling them.

4.4.1

Architecture Design

One important challenge in specifying obligations is that what an obligation requires the
system or users to perform depends upon speciﬁc applications and policy requirements in
the system, which can be quite diverse, as illustrated by the many examples in Section 4.3.
This means that the logic for handling obligations must be extensible.
One architecture that supports this extensibility requirement is to implement
application-speciﬁc modules for handling obligations and “plug” these modules into the
PEP, so that the PEP simply passes obligations to these modules, without the need to have
any logic for handling obligations or understanding the lifecycles of obligations. The design of XACML implies such architecture, because XACML does not specify how the
PEP handles obligations. This design, however, is problematic. The main reason is that
the lifecycle of obligations is intricately intertwined with the PEP’s decision on a request.
Some obligations must be fulﬁlled before a request is to be permitted. Some obligations
must continuously monitor the system progress during an access, and suspend or revoke the
access when they are violated. Forcing obligation handling outside the PEP and into a separate obligation handling component will greatly complicate the interface between them,
decreasing the performance. This also wastes the opportunity to implement the logics for
managing obligation lifecycles and interactions with PEP decisions only once. Implementing these logics only once ensures that they are correctly implemented and consistent across
all obligations, helping policy authors to write policies that use obligations.
Hence we choose the design that the PEP implements the obligation lifecycle logics, the
obligation modules handle application-speciﬁc behaviors, and the PEP and the obligation
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modules use an event mechanism to communicate with each other. Figure 4.1 shows our
proposed architecture.
Access Control Component
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Fig. 4.1.: Proposed architecture for supporting obligations

Architecturally, the overall system is divided into two parts: an Access Control Component (ACC), and an External Environment (EE). The EE is where applications are executed,
and the ACC helps the EE to manage access control to resources. The ACC can be implemented independently of any particular deployment. One reference implementation can be
used in all deployments. Code in the EE, however, needs to know what applications are
used in the deployment and how to interact with them.
The ACC has a PEP, a PDP, and a Timer. Here we focus on runtime policy enforcement, and do not directly deal with policy administration issues, as they are orthogonal to
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the focus of our work. Hence we omit some components in XACML architecture, such
as the Policy Administration Point (PAP). The PEP receives access requests, consults the
PDP for a decision, handles any associated obligations, and makes the ﬁnal decision about
the request. It also needs to manage obligations, sometimes even after an access request
has long completed. Because of this, we divide the PEP into two parts: the main PEP
part, dealing with actions associated with access requests, and the post-access-obligation
handling part, maintaining obligations that need processing after the request has long completed. The former needs access to the PDP and generally needs to make timely decisions.
The performance requirement for the latter is lower.
The EE needs to interact with the ACC. In order to do so, it needs to have interface components, which include an Access Management Interface (AMI) and zero or more Obligation Modules. The AMI is where access requests occur in the system. The exact form of
AMI is deployment-dependent. In the simplest form, the AMI will be code snippets before
each request, which will invoke the PEP for access decisions. In other deployments, the
AMI may also control ongoing access sessions and consult with the PEP to control these
sessions. One might argue that the AMI is really the PEP, since the access decision is enforced by the AMI. We take the view that any policy enforcement component must consist
of two parts. One part is deployment-dependent; it knows what operations on resources
are subject to policy control, and which codes perform these operations. The other part
is deployment-independent; it evaluates access control policies, manages obligations, and
makes the ﬁnal decision on a request. We separate these two parts, calling the former AMI,
and the latter PEP.
The obligation modules implement application-speciﬁc obligation-handling functionalities (such as notifying users, and writing to logs). These modules interact with the PEP
through an event interface. Each module registers itself with the PEP to receive certain
kinds of events, then performs the actions requested in these events, and often reports the
status of these actions back to the PEP and the obligations via events. There may be multiple obligation modules, each handling one family of related obligation actions. For ex-
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ample, one obligation module can handle logging and auditing, another can handle user
interactions, and yet another can handle requirements about notifying data subjects.

4.4.2

Obligations as State Machines

Conceptually, each obligation is a state machine that interacts with the outside world
through events. The state space of all obligations is pre-determined in our approach. At
any time, it is in one of the states in Table 4.2. We organize these states into six stages,
which are described below.
Stage 1: pre-decision. An obligation in this stage means that this obligation wants certain actions to be performed before the PEP makes the decision; the PEP cannot issue the
decision on a request if any mandatory obligation is in the pre-decision stage.
Pre-obligations, which require certain conditions to be satisﬁed before a request can
be permitted, would start in this stage. Until they move onto later stages, the PEP should
not permit the request. Obligations that are associated with a PDP decision other than
Permit may also start here. For example, if a policy identiﬁes a request as coming from an
active attacker, the policy may require switching on certain automatic auditing and tracing
functionalities before denying the request (which may alert the attacker).
Stage 2: decision. An obligation in this stage means that from this obligation’s point of
view, the PEP is free to go ahead and issues its decision about the request; furthermore, the
obligation wants to be notiﬁed about the PEP’s decision via an event. An obligation may
start in this stage if it does not need any processing before the PEP’s ﬁnal decision.
Stage 3: pre-session. An obligation enters this stage only when the obligation is notiﬁed
that the PEP decides to permit the request, and the obligation wants to be notiﬁed when the
access session starts.
Stage 4: during-session. An obligation enters this stage only when there is an ongoing
access session, and the obligation either wants to control the session, or wants to be notiﬁed
when the session terminates.

Table 4.2.: States of an obligation
state name
pre-decision
pre-satisﬁed
pre-failed

stage
1
2
2

pre-session
during-session
monitor-satisﬁed

3
4
4

monitor-unsatisﬁed

4

monitor-terminate

4

post-access
fulﬁlled
violated
ended

5
6
6
6

meaning
the obligation needs processing before the PEP makes decisions;
the pre-decision part of the obligation has been satisﬁed;
the pre-decision part of the obligation has failed; if this obligation is mandatory, then the
PEP must deny the request; if an obligation wants to force a PEP to deny a request even
though the PDP permits it, the obligation should enter this state;
waiting for the event indicating that an access session has started;
waiting for the event indicating that an access session has stopped;
this obligation wants to monitor the access session, and the access session can be permitted
to proceed;
this ongoing obligation is currently unsatisﬁed (but may become satisﬁed later), and the
current access session must be either terminated, or temporarily put on hold until the obligation switches to the monitor-satisﬁed state;
this ongoing obligation has been violated so that the current access session must be terminated;
the obligation is waiting for additional events from the external environment;
the processing of the obligation has completed, and the obligation is fulﬁlled;
the processing of the obligation has completed, and the obligation is violated;
the processing of the obligation has ended before it reaches its natural completion state;
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Stage 5: post-access. An obligation enters this stage if it needs further processing, independent of whether there is an access session, or whether an access session has ended or
not. A post obligation that requires notifying data subjects after access will be in this state
waiting for an event telling whether the notiﬁcation has occurred. An obligation that requires a denied access to be logged with a proof of logging will also be in this state waiting
for the event conﬁrming logging.
Stage 6: completed. The processing of the obligation has completed.

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 4

Stage 5

Stage 6

Fig. 4.2.: Obligation stage transitions

The allowed transitions between states in different stages are given in Figure 4.2. We
note that an obligation does not have to go through all these stages. An obligation must
start at either Stage 1 or Stage 2, and must end in Stage 6 . Stages 3 and 4 can only be
entered when the access request is permitted by the PEP, and Stage 4 can be entered only
when there actually is an access session. Stage 5 is often needed when an obligation wants
to be notiﬁed about whether certain processing required by the obligation succeeds.

4.4.3

Events and Obligations

An obligation needs to specify its behaviors on different events. We choose to reuse the
syntax for rules in XACML policies to specify an obligation’s behavior on events. More
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speciﬁcally, an obligation associates with each state a sequence of rules. When an event
is delivered to an obligation, the PEP ﬁnds the rule sequence associated with the current
state of the obligation, and then evaluates this rule sequence on the event, while providing
other context information from the current request. If a rule is evaluated to be true, then the
effect of the rule speciﬁes the next state the obligation should go to, and optionally events
for the PEP and the external environment.
An obligation in our approach is thus similar to an XACML policy. An XACML policy
takes in a request (which can be viewed as an input event), and uses a ruleset to evaluate
the request to derive a decision (which can be viewed as the resulting state) and optionally
some associated obligations (which can be viewed as output events). Obligations generalize
XACML policies in that they can be evaluated on events other than requests and in that they
have states and may use different rulesets in different states.
We introduce the notion of event families to group related events together. Each event
belongs to one event family. We have three predeﬁned event families. These events are not
handled or created by any external obligation modules, but by the PEP itself. The events in
these families are given in Table 4.3. These three families are explained below.
• PEP-notiﬁcation. These are related to the status of handling the access request. They
are generated by the PEP for obligations. All obligations are required to be prepared

to handle events in this family. This family is the only such required event family.
• PEP-session. These events are generated by the PEP when the PEP can get information about the ongoing access sessions. They are generated by the PEP for obliga-

tions. An obligation which wants to perform actions based on the starting and ending
of access sessions should request to receive events of this family, and be prepared to
handle them.
• Timer. These events are sent between the PEP and the obligations. Obligations that
request time-dependent actions should be prepared to handle events in this family.

Beyond these three families, new families can be deﬁned for different kinds of functionalities that are needed by obligations. For example, one could deﬁne an event family for

Table 4.3.: Pre-deﬁned events: Column 1 gives the event family name; column 2 the event name, and column 4 the stage(s)
in which the event may occur
event name
obligationinterrupt

PEP-notiﬁcation

obligationabort

PEP-notiﬁcation

PDP-permit

PEP-notiﬁcation

PDP-permitPEP-deny

PEP-notiﬁcation
PEP-notiﬁcation

Timer

PDP-deny
PDPindeterminate
PEP-permitted
PEP-denied
accesssession-started
accesssession-ended
timer-request

Timer

timer-cancel

Timer

timer

PEP-notiﬁcation
PEP-notiﬁcation
PEP-session
PEP-session

meaning
The PEP wants the obligation to leave the current state so that the
PEP can proceed to the next step; the obligation should move away
from the current state.
The PEP either does not know how to handle the obligation, or has
encountered error(s) while evaluating the obligation, and is about to
discard the obligation. This event gives the obligation a chance to
deal with this failure in a graceful fashion.
The PDP returned Permit. The PEP plans to permit the request (provided that the necessary obligations are satisﬁed).
The PDP returned Permit; however, the PEP has decided to deny
the request, perhaps because some other mandatory obligations processed earlier have already failed.
The PDP returned Deny. The PEP plans to deny the request.
The PDP returned Indeterminate. The PEP plans to deny the request.

stage
Stages 1-5

The PEP has permitted the request.
The PEP has denied the request.
The access session has started.

Stage 2
Stage 2
Stage 3

The access session has ended.

Stage 4

An event generated by evaluating an obligation, informing the PEP
that the obligation wants to receive a particular Timer event, as speciﬁed in this request.
An event generated by evaluating an obligation, informing the PEP
that the obligation wants to cancel an earlier Timer request.
An event generated by the PEP to an obligation, which has set a
timer via an earlier request.

Stages 1-5

Stages 1-5

Stage 1
Stage 1
Stage 1
Stage 1

Stages 1-5
Stages 1-5
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event family
PEP-notiﬁcation
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logging, which may include one event for requesting to create a log entry, and optionally
another event for notiﬁcation for the success/failure of the logging. For another example,
an event family can be created for user interaction in a speciﬁc application.
Each obligation module understands one or more event families, and registers itself with
the PEP on these event families. When obligations generate events in these families, the
obligation module will receive these events from the PEP. The obligation module may send
events targeting obligations back to the PEP; these events should be in the event families
the module registers itself on.
Similarly, each obligation also speciﬁes what event families it requires. This speciﬁcation serves at least two purposes. First, it helps the PEP to ﬁlter which events to deliver to
the obligation. For example, if an obligation does not want to control the access session,
it will not include the PEP-session family in the list, and the PEP will not deliver sessionrelated events to the obligation. Second, it enables the PEP to quickly check whether it is
able to handle the obligation. If for one event family listed here, no obligation module has
registered to handle it, then the PEP knows that it cannot handle this obligation, and must
consider these obligations as violated.
All events have some common ﬁelds, such as Event Id, Obligation Id, and Message
(which explains the event to humans using text). Within one event family, there can be
multiple types of events. For example, the timer event family has three types of events:
timer-request events, timer-cancel events, and timer events (see Table 4.3 for their meanings). A timer-request event in addition has ﬁelds including the speciﬁcation of the timer,
which is in one of two forms, either a speciﬁc time in future, or a time duration which
speciﬁes a timer that expires after that duration. A timer-cancel or timer event in addition
has a ﬁeld including the Event Id of the corresponding time-request event.

4.4.4

The Schema of Obligations

In the following, we describe the schema of obligations. An obligation has the following elements:
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• FulﬁllOn. This ﬁeld helps determine when an obligation should be returned by the
PDP together with the decision. It can take the following values: permit, deny, error,
and applicable. Their effects will be discussed in Section 4.4.5.
• a boolean variable indicating whether the obligation is optional. Its default value
is no. An optional obligation can be ignored. If the PEP does not understand the

obligation, or does not want to process it for performance or other considerations, it
can ignore the obligation, considering it as fulﬁlled.
• a list of event families that this obligation needs. This speciﬁes what events this
obligation would like to receive and is going to generate.

• a starting state, which is either pre-decision or pre-satisﬁed.
• optional state variables, and their initial values. These variables enable an obligation
to store additional necessary state information; they can be deﬁned using the existing
data types in XACML.
• one or more rulesets, each associated with one state. Processing of an obligation is
always triggered by an event, and when the PEP needs to process an obligation, it
evaluates the ruleset associated with the current state of the obligation. Each ruleset
includes one or more rules which are evaluated in a ﬁrst-applicable manner.
– Each rule is similar to a rule in XACML policy, and it has a target, a condition,
and an effect. Both the target and the condition are predicates, which may refer
to ﬁelds in the event triggered the processing, the context associated with the
request, and state variables within the obligation. If both the target and the
condition are satisﬁed, then the effect is returned.
– The effect contains
⇤ the next state, which will tell which state the obligation should be in after
the processing
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⇤ a (possibly empty) list of assignments to the state variables, which will
change the values of these variables

⇤ a (possibly empty) list of events (which can be Obligation-type events,
Timer-request events or Timer-cancel events) to be sent out

Table 4.4.: BNF syntax of obligations
< Obligations > := < Obligation >⇤
< Obligation > := < InitialS tate >< EventFamilies > [S tateVariables] < S tateRuleS ets >
Attributes: ObligationId, FulfillOn, IsOptional
< InitialS tate > := (‘‘pre decision”|‘‘pre satis f ied”)
< EventFamilies > := < EventFamily >+
< S tateVariables > := < S tateVariable >+
< S tateVariable > := < AttributeValue >
Attributes: StateVariableId, DataType
< S tateRuleS ets > := < S tateRuleS et >+
< S tateRuleS et > := < S tate >< RuleS et >
< S tate > := (‘‘pre decision”|‘‘pre satis f ied”|‘‘pre f ailed”|‘‘pre session”|
‘‘during session”|‘‘monitor satis f ied”|‘‘monitor unsatisi f ied”|
‘‘monitor terminate”|‘‘post access”|‘‘ f ul f illed”|‘‘violated”|‘‘ended”)
< RuleS et > := < Rule >+
< Rule > := [T arget][Condition] < E f f ect >
Attributes: RuleId
< E f f ect > := < NextS tate > [S tateVariableAssignments][Events]
< NextS tate > := (‘‘pre decision”|‘‘pre satis f ied”|‘‘pre f ailed”|‘‘pre session”|
‘‘during session”|‘‘monitor satis f ied”|‘‘monitor unsatisi f ied”|
‘‘monitor terminate”|‘‘post access”|‘‘ f ul f illed”|‘‘violated”|‘‘ended”)
< S tateVariableAssignments > := < S tateVariableAssignment >+
< S tateVariableAssignment > := < AttributeValue >
Attributes: StateVariableId, DataType
< Events > := < Event >+
< Event > := < EventT ype >< Message > [T imer][ObligationFamily]
Attributes: EventId, EventFamilyId, ObligationId,
TimerRequestEventId (optional)
< T imer > := < S tartT ime > | < T imeDuration >

In Table 4.4, we give the BNF syntax for obligations. Note that the EventFamilies
element includes a list of event family which the obligation can handle, such as PEPnotiﬁcation event family, PEP-session event family, Timer event family, different kinds of
obligation related event families, and so on. One example of obligation related families is
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the event family for the logging obligation. This family includes events like Obligationlogging events, Obligation-logging-done events, and Obligation-logging-fail events. In
Figure 4.3, an example is shown for illustrating how to specify obligations in XML.

4.4.5

PDP’s Obligation Handling Logic

The PDP needs to determine what obligations are to be returned together with the policy
decision. Each obligation has a FulﬁllOn ﬁeld. Recall that in XACML, this ﬁeld can take
two values: permit and deny. In our design, we keep the semantics of these two values, but
add two new values: error and applicable. These effects are summarized in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5.: Effects of different values in the FulﬁllOn ﬁeld
permit
deny
error
applicable

Condition under which the obligation will be returned by the PDP
when the current policy permits the request, and this contributes to
the PDP returning permit for the request.
when the current policy denies the request, and this contributes to
the PDP returning deny for the request.
when the current policy results in IN, and this contributes to the PDP
returning IN for the request
when the current policy’s target matches the request; this obligation
will be returned even if current policy’s decision disagrees with the
PDP’s decision.

An obligation whose FulﬁllOn attribute is Permit or Deny is treated exactly the same
as in XACML. This helps compatibility with current XACML semantics. An obligation
whose FulﬁllOn attribute is error will be returned when the policy directly containing the
obligation returns Indeterminate for the request, and so is every parent policy and
the PDP as a whole. By allowing obligations to accompany Indeterminate, we allow
more ﬂexible behaviors when policy errors occur. For example, the obligation may inform
users what should be provided to gain access, or inform the system administrators about
the error via emails.
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<Obligations>
< O b l i g a t i o n O b l i g a t i o n I d = " a c c e p t watchAd l o g " F u l f i l l O n = " P e r m i t " I s O p t i o n a l = " f a l s e " >
< I n i t i a l S t a t e >pre d e c i s i o n < / I n i t i a l S t a t e >
<EventFamilies>
< E v e n t F a m i l y E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " PEP n o t i f i c a t i o n " >< / E v e n t F a m i l y >
< E v e n t F a m i l y E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " PEP s e s s i o n " >< / E v e n t F a m i l y >
< E v e n t F a m i l y E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " Timer " >< / E v e n t F a m i l y >
< E v e n t F a m i l y E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " O b l i g a t i o n music p l a y e r UI " >< / E v e n t F a m i l y >
< E v e n t F a m i l y E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " O b l i g a t i o n l o g g i n g " >< / E v e n t F a m i l y >
</ EventFamilies>
<StateVariables>
< S t a t e V a r i a b l e S t a t e V a r i a b l e I d = " number " DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 . o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema#
i n t e g e r " >< A t t r i b u t e V a l u e >0< / A t t r i b u t e V a l u e >< / S t a t e V a r i a b l e >
</ StateVariables>
<StateRuleSets>
<StateRuleSet>
< S t a t e >pre d e c i s i o n < / S t a t e >
< RuleSet R u l e S e t I d =" pre d e c i s i o n r u l s e t ">
< O b li g a t i o n Ru l e O b l i g a t i o n R u l e I d =" r u l e 1 ">
< Condition FunctionId =" u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : a n d ">
<Apply F u n c t i o n I d = " u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : a n y U R I e q u a l " >
< A t t r i b u t e V a l u e DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 . o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# anyURI " > a c c e p t
watchAd l o g < / A t t r i b u t e V a l u e >
< E v e n t A t t r i b u t e S e l e c t o r E v e n t F i e l d = " O b l i g a t i o n I d " DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 .
o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# anyURI " / >< / Apply >
<Apply F u n c t i o n I d = " u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : a n y U R I e q u a l " >
< A t t r i b u t e V a l u e DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 . o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# anyURI " >PEP
notification </ AttributeValue>
< E v e n t A t t r i b u t e S e l e c t o r E v e n t F i e l d = " E v e n t F a m i l y I d " DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3
. o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# anyURI " / >< / Apply >
<Apply F u n c t i o n I d = " u r n : o a s i s : n a m e s : t c : x a c m l : 1 . 0 : f u n c t i o n : s t r i n g e q u a l " >
< A t t r i b u t e V a l u e DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 . o r g / 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# s t r i n g " >PDP
permit</ AttributeValue >
< E v e n t A t t r i b u t e S e l e c t o r E v e n t F i e l d = " E v e n t T y p e " DataType = " h t t p : / / www. w3 . o r g
/ 2 0 0 1 / XMLSchema# s t r i n g " / >< / Apply >
</ Condition>
<ObligationEffect>
< N e x t S t a t e >pre d e c i s i o n < / N e x t S t a t e >
<Events>
< E v e n t E v e n t I d = " o b l i g a t i o n a c c e p t " E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " O b l i g a t i o n music p l a y e r
UI " O b l i g a t i o n I d = " a c c e p t watchAd l o g " >
<EventType> O b l i g a t i o n accept agreement < / EventType>
< O b l i g a t i o n F a m i l y >Accept< / O b l i g a t i o n F a m i l y >
< Message > P l e a s e a c c e p t t h e l i c e n s e a g r e e m e n t < / Message >
< / Event>
< E v e n t E v e n t I d = " t i m e r r e q u e s t s i x t y s e c o n d s " E v e n t F a m i l y I d = " Timer "
O b l i g a t i o n I d = " a c c e p t watchAd l o g " >
<EventType> timer r e q u e s t < / EventType>
< Timer >< T i m e r D u r a t i o n >PT60S< / T i m e r D u r a t i o n >< / Timer >
< Message >The o b l i g a t i o n s h o u l d be f u l f i l l e d w i t h i n 60 s e c o n d s < / Message >
< / Event>
< / Events>
</ ObligationEffect>
</ ObligationRule>
......
< / RuleSet>
</ StateRuleSet>
......
</ StateRuleSets>
</ Obligation>
......
</ Obligations>

Fig. 4.3.: An example obligation in XML
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An obligation whose FulﬁllOn is “applicable” is returned when the policy directly containing the obligation does not return NA. This enables a policy to “force” an obligation up
the policy hierarchy, no matter what the PDP’s decision of the request will be.

4.4.6

PEP’s Obligation Handling Logic

The PEP maintains a current state for each obligation it is processing. The PEP processes an obligation by sending an event to it. The PEP will choose the ruleset corresponding to the current state that the obligation is in, and then will evaluate the ruleset against
the event, the context of the request with which the obligation is associated, and the state
variables. How the PEP handles obligations is shown in the pseudo-code in Algorithm 1.
In part I, the PEP obtains the PDP decision together with obligations, and initializes
the values of PEP_decision and Permit_to_Deny accordingly. In part II, the PEP notiﬁes
all obligations, i.e., pre-obligations, that require processing before the ﬁnal PEP decisions
are made. In part III, the PEP waits until all obligations move past pre-decision stage. In
part IV, the PEP can ﬁnally issue its decision on the request, and can notify obligations
about the decision. In part V, the PEP handles obligations, i.e., ongoing-obligations and
post-obligations, after the decision.
For the sake of space limitation and clarity, Algorithm 1 is simpliﬁed by leaving out
details to address some issues. One issue is how to deal with optional obligations. We use
the following approach. After Part I, a routine is called to determine how each optional
obligation is to be handled. There are three possibilities. An optional obligation may
be discarded, meaning that the PEP simply ignores it. An optional obligation may be
attempted, meaning that the PEP will try to fulﬁll it; however, any failure in fulﬁllment
will not affect the PEP decision. Or it may be turned to mandatory, meaning that the PEP
commits to fulﬁll this obligation and treats it as a mandatory one.
In Algorithm 1, the PEP needs to wait for all obligations to move beyond the predecision stage to make the ﬁnal decision. However, it is possible that one obligation refuses to move on. This may occur because the obligation itself is erroneous, or because it
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Algorithm 1: Pseudo-code of PEP obligation handling logic (simpliﬁed version)
1

PEP_decide(Request)
1: {Part I: Obtain PDP decision and obligations, and initialize.}
2: (PDP_decision, Obligations)
evaluate(Policy, Request);
3: if PDP_decision == Permit then
4:
PEP_decision May_Permit;
5: else
6:
PEP_decision Deny;
7: Permit_to_Deny
false;
8:
9: {Part II: Notify all obligations that require processing before decisions are made.}
10: for all obligation Ob that is in pre-decision state do
11:
evaluate(Ob, event(PDP_decision));
12:
if Ob.state == pre-failed and PEP_decision == May_Permit then
13:
PEP_decision Deny;
14:
Permit_to_Deny true;
15:
break;
16: if Permit_to_Deny == true then
17:
for all obligation Ob that is in pre-decision state do
18:
evaluate(Ob, event(PDP-permit-PEP-deny));
19:
20: {Part III: Wait until all obligations move past pre-decision stage.}
21: while at least one obligation in pre-decision state do
22:
wait for Ext_event, event from the external environment;
23:
Ob = the obligation that Ext_event is directed to;
24:
evaluate(Ob, Ext_event);
25:
if Ob.state == pre-failed and PEP_decision == May_Permit then
26:
PEP_decision Deny;
27:
for all obligation Obp still in pre-decision state do
28:
evaluate(Obp, event(PDP-permit-PEP-deny));
29:
break;
30:
31: {Part IV: Decide the request, and notify obligations about the decision.}
32: if PEP_decision == May_Permit then
33:
PEP_decision Permit;
34: decide_request(PEP_decision);
35: for all obligation Ob in decision stage do
36:
evaluate(Ob, event(PEP-decision);
37:
38: {Part V: handles obligations after the decision.}
39: while at least one obligation not in completed stage do
40:
wait for Ext_event, event from the external environment;
41:
Ob = the obligation that Ext_event is directed to;
42:
evaluate(Ob, Ext_event);
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is waiting for an external event that has not arrived yet. To avoid delaying a decision indeterminately, the PEP may need to set a timer for itself for how long to wait for obligations
to move on. When the timer is ﬁred, the PEP sends an “obligation-interrupt” event to force
it to leave the current state. An obligation can decide what to do when receiving such an
event. It can directly move to the the ﬁnal stage, such as the violated state. It can also move
to a later, but not ﬁnal, stage, and request follow-up actions because of this failure.
The obligations’ state changes must follow the logic we lay out in Section 4.4.2. For
example, an obligation should never move from a later stage to an earlier stage, and an
obligation in the decision stage, after receiving an PEP-notiﬁcation event, should not stay
in this stage, and so on. After evaluating each obligation, the PEP should check that the
obligation’s new state is within the allowed logic. When encountering such a logic error
with an obligation, the PEP should send an “obligation-abort” event to the obligation. After
that, the PEP discards the obligation.
In Algorithm 1 we also omitted codes to deal with obligations that want to monitor
the access session. These obligations will be in Stages 3 and 4. The logic, however, is
straightforward. When the PEP knows that an access session has started, it notiﬁes all
obligations in the pre-session state (Stage 3). When any mandatory obligation is in the
monitor-unsatisﬁed state, the PEP must suspend the access session. When any mandatory
obligation is in the monitor-terminate state, the PEP must terminate the access session.
When all mandatory obligations that are in Stage 4 are in the monitor-satisﬁed state, the
access session can be resumed or continued. When the access session ends, the PEP notiﬁes
all obligations in Stage 4 using an access-session-ended event, and expects all obligations
to move to Stages 5 or 6.

4.4.7

Meeting the Challenges

We now brieﬂy discuss how our design for obligation handling, as speciﬁed above,
meet the challenges we identiﬁed in Section 4.3. First, obligations are state machines and
contain rules that can process events. This supports pre-, post-, ongoing- obligations, and
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any combination of them. This also enables obligations to perform different post actions
depending on the state of what happens during the pre and/or ongoing stages.
Second, our architectural choices of implementing the obligation lifecycle logic in the
PEP, while using obligation modules to handle application-speciﬁc actions enable the PEP
to make access decisions and process obligations based on the status of obligations in the
system, and at the same time, provide the extensibility for diverse kinds of obligations.
In our design, failure to fulﬁll mandatory obligations may cause the PEP to deny a
request when the PDP returns Permit; however, failure to fulﬁll obligations can never
cause the PEP to permit a request when the PDP returns Deny. Also note that in our design,
one obligation can perform different actions based on whether the PEP’s ﬁnal decision is
Permit or Deny. This enables an obligation that is returned with a PDP Permit decision
to easily deal with the case that the PEP needs to deny the request. We also allow forced
obligations, as well as obligations helping to deal with policy evaluation errors.

4.5

Implementation
In this section, we ﬁrst describe a concrete example of using our design, and then our

implementation of the design.

4.5.1

Application

We use as example an obligation that combines a pre-obligation, an ongoing-obligation,
and a post-obligation. In order to use an application called MusicPlayer to listen to the
latest songs, a user has to accept the license agreement within 60 seconds. After listening
to every 6 songs, the user needs to watch an Ad which will go away by itself after 5
seconds. If the user watches the Ad for less than 5 seconds, the access will be stopped.
The access information will be logged after the obligation is completed, no matter whether
the obligation is fulﬁlled or violated.
The state transition diagram of this obligation is shown in Figure 4.4. Initially, the
obligation is in the pre-decision state. After the obligation receives a “PDP-permit" event,
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Fig. 4.4.: State transitions of a combining obligation

it stays in the pre-decision state, and sends out two events. One event asks the user to accept
the license agreement, and the other is a timer-request event specifying a timer duration of
60 seconds.
If the user does not accept the agreement within 60 seconds, the PEP will send a timer
event to the obligation, and the obligation will enter the pre-failed state. The PEP now
must deny the request and notify the obligation about the decision, causing the obligation
to enter the post-access state, while sending out an event requiring the PEP to log the
access information. After receiving an event conﬁrming logging, the obligation goes to the
violated state.
If the user does accept the agreement within 60 seconds, the obligation will receive
an event from the external environment (i.e., an external event) indicating that the user
has done so. The obligation enters the pre-satisﬁed state, and then upon receiving the
“PEP-permitted" event, the obligation enters the pre-session state. Later the obligation is
triggered by a “access-session-started" event and enters the monitor-satisﬁed state. The
obligation receives an event whenever a new song is played, and uses a state variable to

48
record the number of songs that have been played currently. If an external event indicating
that the next song is played comes and the value of the state variable is still less than 6,
the obligation stays in the monitor-satisﬁed state. If the number reaches 6, the obligation
enters the monitor-unsatisﬁed state, as well as generating an event requiring the user to
watch an Ad for 5 seconds. If the user has watched the Ad for 5 seconds, the obligation
goes back to the monitor-satisﬁed state. If the user does not do so, the obligation goes to
the monitor-terminate state, forcing the PEP to terminate the access. The obligation then
moves to the post-access state, to deal with the post-access logging requirement.
The user might actively terminate the access. When the obligation is in the monitorsatisﬁed state and receives an “access-session-ended" event, it enters the post-access state.
Finally, the obligation enters the fulﬁlled state, completing the transitions.

4.5.2

Implementation of ExtXACML

Following the design in Section 4.4, we have implemented a prototype system called
ExtXACML, based on SUN’s XACML implementation [1]. The architecture of ExtXACML is shown in Figure 4.1. Note that the PEP, the PDP and the Timer are general ones
for an XACML system, while the AMI and the Obligation modules are application-speciﬁc.
We implemented the AMI and the Obligation modules for the application described in Section 4.5.1.
AMI is the component that interacts with users. Via AMI, a user can start a request
asking for listening to songs, play the next song, terminate the current access actively, and
exit the system.
There are two Obligation modules in the implementation: MusicPlayerUIObligationModule, and LogObligationModule. MusicPlayerUIObligationModule deals with user interactions. It shows the license agreement and notiﬁes the obligation about the user’s action.
It also shows an Ad for 5 and records whether the user has closed it within 5 seconds. LogObligationModule logs the access information no matter the access is allowed or denied.
The former module requires actions from the user, while the latter needs a system action.
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In other applications, there might be other Obligation modules for notifying administrators,
and sending emails, etc. ExtXACML is extensible in that new Obligation modules can be
added into the system to handle various obligations for different applications.
These Obligation modules register themselves to the PEP to receive certain kinds of
events, and send events targeting speciﬁc obligations back to the PEP, which then sends
the events to appropriate obligations. For example, the MusicPlayerUIObligationModule
informs the PEP that it wants to receive and handle events in the Obligation-music-playerUI family.
The PDP evaluates requests based on the policies loaded, and then returns a PDP decision, together with a (possibly empty) list of obligations. We use the PDP implementation
in SunXACML.
The PEP is the main component of ExtXACML. After the PEP receives a request, it
assigns a request Id to this request, calls the PDP to evaluate the request, and obtains the
result. If the list of obligations is empty, the PEP can directly decide whether the request
is allowed or not on the basis of the PDP decision. Otherwise, the next step is to deal with
the obligations whose fulﬁllment might affect the ﬁnal PEP decision, which is shown in
Algorithm 1. The PEP keeps a state for each obligation, recording request Id, subject Id,
action Id, the result returned from the PDP, the obligation’s current state, and a (possibly
empty) list of state variables. The only state variable used in the MusicPlayer example
is the number of songs that have been played since the last Ad. When events come, the
obligation rules will be evaluated, the state will be updated, and some other events will be
sent out.
Our implementation needs to deal with timers. In particular, ExtXACML supports two
forms of timer, either a speciﬁc time in future or a time duration, and it sets or cancels a
timer via events from the timer event family. We use the java.util.Timer class to implement
this. Also, while we reuse the code in SunXACML for evaluating rulesets in obligations,
we need to extend the mechanisms for obtaining context information. XACML uses AttributeSelector and AttributeDesignator for this purpose. ExtXACML adds two new se-
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lectors, EventAttributeSelector and StateVariableSelector, to fetch necessary information
from events and state variables for evaluating obligation rules.

4.6

Conclusion
Handling obligations in practical access control systems requires addressing several

challenges. For example, there are different types of obligations, and failures of fulﬁlling
these obligations might affect the PEP’s decision made on a request. Furthermore, the
PEP’s decision might also affect which obligations should be carried out and how they
should behave.
To meet these challenges, we have proposed a language for specifying obligations. In
this language, an obligation is modeled as a state machine which communicates with the
PEP and the external environment via events, and includes rulesets to specify its responses
to input events. This allows one to specify sophisticated obligations. We have also introduced an architecture for handling access control policies with those obligations, extending
XACML’s speciﬁcation and architecture. We designed a simple yet extensible architecture
which allows new types of obligation to be included by adding new obligation modules.
Based on SUN’s XACML implementation, we implemented our design into a prototype
system called ExtXACML for a speciﬁc application. Our prototype is extensible in that
new obligation modules can be attached to handle different types of obligations.
Although obligations are deployment-dependent, it is still possible to build libraries
for some commonly used obligations, such as logging access information and notifying
administrators via emails. One future direction is to deﬁne event families for these kinds
of obligations and implement the obligation modules.
Our model of obligations can be viewed as a generalized version of access control policies. One can view them as special cases of dynamic policies, i.e., policy objects that can
be dynamically created and that can create other policy objects as the effects of evaluating
them. Such dynamic policies can be modeled as state machines that use rulesets to process
input events, and generate output events, possibly accompanied by other policy objects.
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Such dynamic policies may also be useful to model stateful access control policies, administrative policies for selecting appropriate access control policies for a request, policies for
data objects dynamically created from combining multiple protected objects, and so on.
We plan to explore interesting aspects of dynamic policies, e.g., their formal speciﬁcation,
enforcement mechanism, practical applications, etc.
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5. TRI-MODULARIZATION OF FIREWALL POLICIES
Firewall policies are notorious for having misconﬁguration errors which can defeat its intended purpose of protecting hosts in the network from malicious users. We believe this
is because today’s ﬁrewall policies are mostly monolithic. Inspired by ideas from modular
programming and code refactoring, in this chapter we introduce three kinds of modules:
primary, auxiliary, and template, which facilitate the refactoring of a ﬁrewall policy into
smaller, reusable, comprehensible, and more manageable components. We present algorithms for generating each of the three modules for a given legacy ﬁrewall policy. We also
develop ModFP, an automated tool for converting legacy ﬁrewall policies represented in
access control list to their modularized format. With the help of ModFP, when examining
several real-world policies with sizes ranging from dozens to hundreds of rules, we were
able to identify subtle errors.

5.1

Introduction
A ﬁrewall is among the ﬁrst lines of defenses for protecting a network (or, a host) from

malicious users. A ﬁrewall intercepts network packets, and based on a speciﬁc ﬁrewall
policy, decides whether to allow or deny certain packets to pass through it. As ﬁrewalls
are developed by many vendors (e.g., Cisco, Check Point), the syntaxes and semantics of
ﬁrewall policy languages vary. However, at its core, most of the packet ﬁltering rules expressed in these speciﬁcation languages can be translated into an access control list (ACL)
representation. An ACL ﬁrewall policy is speciﬁed as an ordered list of rules. Each rule
has the form “target!action”, in which target speciﬁes a set of packets to which this rule
is applicable, and action states what should be done with the packet. In an ACL, multiple

rules can be applicable to a single packet and the decision of the ﬁrst rule that is applicable
to the packet is imposed on the packet. This is known as the “ﬁrst match semantics”.
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Due to the dynamic nature of a network and its surrounding environment (e.g., addition of new services, discovery of new attacks, a host becoming compromised), the ﬁrewall
policies must evolve over time, in order to maintain a robust defense against malicious
users while allowing legitimate trafﬁc. Hence, it is necessary for ﬁrewall policies to be intellectually manageable, a term used in the context of programming by Edsger W. Dijkstra
in his 1972 ACM Turing Lecture [83]. That is, administrators should be able to understand
existing policies, possibly designed by other administrators. They should be able to modify a policy to achieve some intended objectives, mentally assess what the policy does, and
“debug” the policy when problems arise.
Regrettably, many ﬁrewall policies are not intellectually manageable. For instance, it
has been observed that most ﬁrewalls on the Internet are poorly designed and have many
conﬁguration errors in their rules [2, 3]. As ﬁrewalls can only be as effective as their conﬁguration, misconﬁgurations of ﬁrewalls undermine their intended purpose of protecting
the networks in question, causing ﬁrewalls to offer only a false sense of security.
One characteristic of ﬁrewall ACL languages is that two ACL rules may be in conﬂict
with each other if they have different decisions (e.g., one allows the packet to pass, and the
other drops the packet) but their applicable sets of packets overlap. This means that the
semantic of one rule may be changed by other rules that are in conﬂict with it. Because of
this, writing ﬁrewall policies has been compared with writing programs with extensive use
of goto statements. (See, e.g., [54].) However, as policy rules often have exceptions, more
often than not using conﬂicts is the most succinct way of expressing actual policies.
We argue that (1) the potential for conﬂicts is only one of three factors causing the
difﬁculty. The other two are (2) policies expressed in ACL-based languages are monolithic;
and (3) complex policies require a large number of rules. A monolithic policy can only be
understood as a whole. This becomes infeasible as the policy gets large, since most people
are unable to put a large amount of information in the working memory.
Since we cannot change the fact that many policies are inherently complex and that
conﬂicts are useful, the only factor we can affect is the monolithic nature of current ﬁrewall
policies. A notion of modular ﬁrewall policy was introduced in [58], where a ﬁrewall
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policy is considered modular if the policy is partitioned into multiple policy components
M1 , . . . , Mr such that each packet is accepted by at most one component. This approach
is still inherently monolithic, since one still potentially needs to examine all components
when trying to understand what is the decision for one packet.
The goal of our work is to elevate ﬁrewall policies from monolithic to modular. Our
contributions are as follows.
First, we recognize ﬁve requirements for a successful modularization approach (i.e.,
logical partitioning, isolation among modules, ﬂexible partitioning structure, humancomputable policy slicing, and readily deployability), and analyze existing approaches using these requirements to identify their shortcomings.
Second, we introduce our approach of modularizing ﬁrewall policies. This includes
the concept of a primary attribute, which is either the source IP, the destination IP, or the
service. The optimal choice of the primary attribute is policy dependent, although for the
several dozens of policies we have observed, most of them beneﬁt more from choosing the
destination IP as the primary attribute. A policy is partitioned into three kinds of modules:
primary, auxiliary, and template. Beyond making policies more modular and easier to
understand, our approach also supports policy refactoring, either by distilling templates
from recurring patterns, or by breaking up a large module into multiple smaller ones, each
covering a subset of the IP range.
Third, to support legacy ﬁrewall policies, we have deﬁned a 5-step process and introduced algorithms for converting them into their modularized form. We have also implemented an automated tool called ModFP for this purpose. By utilizing ModFP, we have
converted several real-world ﬁrewall policies into their modularized form, and found that
the process consistently improved the understanding of a policy, and the beneﬁt is much
more signiﬁcant when the policy is large and/or when it has substantial usage of both permit
and deny rules. For majority of the real-world ﬁrewall policies, their modularized version—
translated with ModFP—enjoys a signiﬁcant number of rule reduction (i.e., 25.3%-68.7%)
compared to the original ACL policy. Additionally, the translation from ACL to the modularized version takes a matter of seconds (i.e., 0.26-19.35 seconds). For every large policy
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we have examined, we have found clear errors (such as redundant rules) as well as irregularities that we conjecture to be errors. For one such policy deployed in a corporate setting,
we were able to contact the administrators and conﬁrm that most of our ﬁndings are indeed
policy errors.

5.2

Overview of Firewall Policies
A ﬁrewall typically operates at the gateway of a network to protect the network. The

ﬁrewall determines whether to allow (resp., deny) certain packets based on some conﬁgurable ﬁrewall policy. Such a policy considers the following ﬁelds of a packet while matching it against the rules’ target: source IP address (denoted by sIP), source port (denoted by
sPort), destination IP address (denoted by dIP), destination port (denoted by dPort), and

protocol/service (denoted by protocol). A ﬁrewall policy consists of rules, where each rule
has the form “target ! action”, where the four actions in Table 5.1 are possible.
Table 5.1.: Four actions in ﬁrewall rules
action
allow
deny
chainY
return

Effect of action
allow the matched packet to pass
drop the matched packet
for matched packet, go use chain “Y”
resume calling chain

Most ﬁrewall languages use a simple list model where each rule’s action (or, decision) is
either allow or deny. Linux netﬁlter uses a complex chain model, where a policy consists of
multiple chains and all four actions can be used. The chainY action directs the evaluation to
another chain Y, which should include rules using the return action. Similar to a subroutine,
the chain Y can be invoked from multiple places.
In a policy, more than one rules may match a packet, and their decisions may conﬂict.
Firewall rule lists use the “ﬁrst match semantics”. Hence, the order in which the rules are
organized is important in making the decision about whether a packet should be accepted or
denied. Most policies have a “catch-all" rule as the last rule, which will match all packets
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and provide a default decision for any packet that is not matched by any earlier rules. In
most cases, this “catch-all” rule has “deny” as the decision.

5.3

Tri-Modularization Design Philosophy
In the context of software engineering, modularization signiﬁes the concept of breaking

up large, monolithic software source code and organizing them into smaller, reusable units
based on the speciﬁc tasks these units implement. Modularization hence reduces the size of
a program due to reusability, and makes a program easier to understand and debug, making
it less error-prone and more reliable. Although the concept of modularization in ﬁrewall
policies is very appealing, it is not obvious how to most effectively achieve this.

5.3.1

Requirements

In the context of ﬁrewall policies, a modularization approach would divide a policy
into smaller pieces, which we call modules. To be able to analyze the effectiveness of
different approaches of introducing modularization into policies, we identify the following
requirements for a successful modularization approach.
Isolation among modules. The modules should be (at least partially) isolated. By isolation, we mean that the interactions among modules are limited and well deﬁned. Only with
adequate isolation, would it be possible to understand what each module achieves, without
requiring to keep the details of other modules in one’s mind. This also makes it possible to
make local changes without unintended global side effects.
Logical partitioning. The criteria of partitioning should be simple and logical. That is,
it should be easy to identify modules that are relevant to a particular situation. This and
the isolation requirements together enable one to ﬁrst have a global and high-level view
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of a policy, without understanding each module in depth, and then gradually reﬁne the
understanding by understanding the modules one by one.
Flexible partitioning structure. The partitioning should be ﬂexible enough so that when
a module becomes too large, one can break it up. This requirement is motivated by the
dynamic nature of policies and aims at supporting policy refactoring. A policy often needs
to evolve over time resulting in large modules which should then be broken up.
Human-computable policy slicing. To help understand policies, it is necessary to support
mental policy slicing. In computer programming, program slicing [84] is the computation
of the set of program statements (i.e., the program slice) that may affect the values at some
point of interest. In the context of a ﬁrewall policy, slicing can be done not only for a
single packet, but also for some natural subspace of the whole space of possible packets.
For intellectual manageability of policies, it is desirable that administrators can mentally
calculate relevant slices of a policy with respect to a given packet or packet space.
Deployability. If an approach can only be deployed with a new ﬁrewall product that
provides specialized support for it, then the beneﬁt of modularization can be exploited
by that product’s customers alone. On the contrary, if modularization can be adopted by
someone who understands the approach when writing a policy with existing products, then
it can be adopted widely.

5.3.2

Two Extremes of Expressing Policies

Our tri-modularization design is the result of our investigation of many real-world ﬁrewall policies and the analysis of how to express them in a succinct and intellectually manageable way. However, it is natural to ask what is the philosophy behind tri-modularization
and why such a design is useful in practice.
Effectively expressing a function. Abstractly, a ﬁrewall policy is a function that maps
a tuple of several input attribute values (e.g., IP address, port) to a binary decision (i.e.,
allow or deny). Our problem is similar to that of how to most effectively represent boolean

functions. Standard ways of expressing boolean functions include truth tables, boolean
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formulas, and circuits. Firewall policies differ in that the input attributes are not boolean.
Some of these attributes (such as IP addresses) can take a very broad range of values hence
using truth tables for our purpose is infeasible.
The typical approach of using a rule list (or, ACL representation) is close in spirit to
using a formula to express a function. The problem is that when the number of rules is
large, the formula becomes complicated and difﬁcult to understand.
Another approach that has been proposed is the ﬁrewall decision diagram (FDD) which
partitions the whole packet space, attribute by attribute [54, 55]. This is similar to using a
circuit. The problem is that the circuits can become large, as it requires a large number of
redundancies. In the case of FDD, partitioning is performed using all policy attributes.
Table 5.2 gives a running example policy. It is an abridged version of an actual policy
used in a large-scale US-based IT organization. The complete policy is given in Table 5.3
and has 209 rules. To ﬁx a misconﬁguration error in the policy that we have found and the
administrator has conﬁrmed, two rules need to be added, resulting in a 211-rule policy. The
added rules are rules 15 and 51 in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2.: The original ﬁrewall policy in ACL
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

1

71.100.64.0/19

*

*

deny

2

71.240.50.0/26

*

*

deny

3

71.206.182.0/24

*

*

deny

4

71.121.88.84

207.89.182.41

25

allow

5

71.121.92.96

207.89.182.41

25

allow

6

*

*

25

deny

7

*

*

137

deny

8

*

*

445

deny

9

*

*

135

deny

10

*

*

138

deny

continued on next page
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Table 5.2.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

11

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.184

1953-1954

allow

12

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.191

1953-1954

allow

13

71.14.116.1

207.89.176.60

1953-1954

allow

14

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.41

1953-1954

allow

15

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.248

1953-1954

allow

16

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.57

1953-1954

allow

17

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.128/26 1953-1954

allow

18

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.184

1950-1951

allow

19

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.191

1950-1951

allow

20

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.41

1950-1951

allow

21

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.248

1950-1951

allow

22

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.57

1950-1951

allow

23

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.128/26 1950-1951

allow

24

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.184

1960

allow

25

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.191

1960

allow

26

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.41

1960

allow

27

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.248

1960

allow

28

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.57

1960

allow

29

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.128/26

1960

allow

30

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.184

1960

allow

31

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.191

1960

allow

32

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.41

1960

allow

33

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.248

1960

allow

34

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.57

1960

allow

35

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.128/26

1960

allow
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Table 5.2.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

36

*

71.121.90.184

1953-1954

deny

37

*

71.121.90.191

1953-1954

deny

38

*

207.89.182.41

1953-1954

deny

39

*

207.89.182.248

1953-1954

deny

40

*

207.89.182.57

1953-1954

deny

41

*

71.121.90.128/26 1953-1954

deny

42

*

71.121.90.184

1950

deny

43

*

71.121.90.191

1950

deny

44

*

207.89.182.41

1950

deny

45

*

207.89.182.248

1950

deny

46

*

207.89.182.57

1950

deny

47

*

71.121.90.128/26

1950

deny

48

*

71.121.90.184

1960

deny

49

*

71.121.90.191

1960

deny

50

*

207.89.182.41

1960

deny

51

*

207.89.182.248

1960

deny

52

*

207.89.182.57

1960

deny

53

*

71.121.90.128/26

1960

deny

54

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

22

allow

55

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

80

allow

56

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

443

allow

57

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

5800-5809

allow

58

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

5900-5909

allow

59

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

3690

allow

60

*

71.121.90.154

*

deny
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Table 5.2.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

61

71.0.0.0/8

*

*

allow

62

71.67.94.12

207.89.182.27

55555

allow

63

71.121.92.53

207.89.182.179

52311

allow

64

207.89.182.142

207.89.182.57

179

allow

65

207.89.182.143

207.89.182.57

179

allow

66

71.0.0.0/8

*

80

allow

67

71.121.88.50

207.89.182.17

52311

allow

68

71.121.59.54

207.89.182.17

52311

allow

69

*

*

*

deny

Table 5.3.: The complete version of the policy in Table 5.2
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

1

71.100.64.0/19

*

*

deny

2

71.240.50.0/26

*

*

deny

3

71.206.182.0/24

*

*

deny

4

71.206.190.0/23

*

*

deny

5

71.206.188.0/24

*

*

deny

6

71.206.91.0/24

*

*

deny

7

71.206.88.0/23

*

*

deny

8

71.196.181.0/24

*

*

deny

9

71.196.56.0/22

*

*

deny

10

71.128.0.0/13

*

*

deny

11

71.59.128.0/17

*

*

deny

12

71.59.32.0/19

*

*

deny

13

71.59.11.0/24

*

*

deny
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

14

71.59.8.0/23

*

*

deny

15

71.59.12.0/22

*

*

deny

16

71.59.16.0/20

*

*

deny

17

71.59.64.0/18

*

*

deny

18

71.121.88.84

207.89.182.61

25

allow

19

71.121.88.84

207.89.182.41

25

allow

20

71.121.92.96

207.89.182.61

25

allow

21

71.121.92.96

207.89.182.41

25

allow

22

*

*

25

deny

23

*

*

137

deny

24

*

*

445

deny

25

*

*

135

deny

26

*

*

138

deny

27

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.184

1953-1954

allow

28

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.191

1953-1954

allow

29

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.37

1953-1954

allow

30

71.14.116.1

207.89.176.14

1953-1954

allow

31

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.57

1953-1954

allow

32

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.61

1953-1954

allow

33

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.41

1953-1954

allow

34

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.27

1953-1954

allow

35

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.26

1953-1954

allow

36

71.14.116.1

207.89.171.57

1953-1954

allow

37

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.251

1953-1954

allow

38

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.250

1953-1954

allow
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

39

71.14.116.1

207.89.170.190

1953-1954

allow

40

71.14.116.1

207.89.174.60

1953-1954

allow

41

71.14.116.1

207.89.176.60

1953-1954

allow

42

71.14.116.1

207.89.179.185

1953-1954

allow

43

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.107

1953-1954

allow

44

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.179

1953-1954

allow

45

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.198

1953-1954

allow

46

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.50

1953-1954

allow

47

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.143

1953-1954

allow

48

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.142

1953-1954

allow

49

71.14.116.1

207.89.182.17

1953-1954

allow

50

71.14.116.1

71.121.90.128/26 1953-1954

allow

51

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.184

1950-1951

allow

52

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.191

1950-1951

allow

53

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.37

1950-1951

allow

54

71.87.147.117

207.89.176.14

1950-1951

allow

55

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.57

1950-1951

allow

56

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.61

1950-1951

allow

57

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.41

1950-1951

allow

58

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.27

1950-1951

allow

59

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.26

1950-1951

allow

60

71.87.147.117

207.89.171.57

1950-1951

allow

61

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.251

1950-1951

allow

62

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.250

1950-1951

allow

63

71.87.147.117

207.89.170.190

1950-1951

allow
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

64

71.87.147.117

207.89.174.60

1950-1951

allow

65

71.87.147.117

207.89.179.185

1950-1951

allow

66

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.248

1950-1951

allow

67

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.107

1950-1951

allow

68

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.179

1950-1951

allow

69

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.198

1950-1951

allow

70

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.50

1950-1951

allow

71

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.143

1950-1951

allow

72

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.142

1950-1951

allow

73

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.17

1950-1951

allow

74

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.128/26 1950-1951

allow

75

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.184

1960

allow

76

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.191

1960

allow

77

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.37

1960

allow

78

71.87.147.117

207.89.176.14

1960

allow

79

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.57

1960

allow

80

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.61

1960

allow

81

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.41

1960

allow

82

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.27

1960

allow

83

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.26

1960

allow

84

71.87.147.117

207.89.171.57

1960

allow

85

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.251

1960

allow

86

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.250

1960

allow

87

71.87.147.117

207.89.170.190

1960

allow

88

71.87.147.117

207.89.174.60

1960

allow
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

89

71.87.147.117

207.89.179.185

1960

allow

90

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.248

1960

allow

91

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.107

1960

allow

92

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.179

1960

allow

93

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.198

1960

allow

94

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.50

1960

allow

95

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.143

1960

allow

96

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.142

1960

allow

97

71.87.147.117

207.89.182.17

1960

allow

98

71.87.147.117

71.121.90.128/26

1960

allow

99

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.184

1960

allow

100

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.191

1960

allow

101

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.37

1960

allow

102

71.67.95.202

207.89.176.14

1960

allow

103

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.57

1960

allow

104

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.61

1960

allow

105

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.41

1960

allow

106

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.27

1960

allow

107

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.26

1960

allow

108

71.67.95.202

207.89.171.57

1960

allow

109

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.251

1960

allow

110

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.250

1960

allow

111

71.67.95.202

207.89.170.190

1960

allow

112

71.67.95.202

207.89.174.60

1960

allow

113

71.67.95.202

207.89.179.185

1960

allow

continued on next page
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

114

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.248

1960

allow

115

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.107

1960

allow

116

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.179

1960

allow

117

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.198

1960

allow

118

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.50

1960

allow

119

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.143

1960

allow

120

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.142

1960

allow

121

71.67.95.202

207.89.182.17

1960

allow

122

71.67.95.202

71.121.90.128/26

1960

allow

123

*

71.121.90.184

1953-1954

deny

124

*

71.121.90.191

1953-1954

deny

125

*

207.89.182.37

1953-1954

deny

126

*

207.89.176.14

1953-1954

deny

127

*

207.89.182.57

1953-1954

deny

128

*

207.89.182.61

1953-1954

deny

129

*

207.89.182.41

1953-1954

deny

130

*

207.89.182.27

1953-1954

deny

131

*

207.89.182.26

1953-1954

deny

132

*

207.89.171.57

1953-1954

deny

133

*

207.89.182.251

1953-1954

deny

134

*

207.89.182.250

1953-1954

deny

135

*

207.89.170.190

1953-1954

deny

136

*

207.89.174.60

1953-1954

deny

137

*

207.89.179.185

1953-1954

deny

138

*

207.89.182.248

1953-1954

deny

continued on next page
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

139

*

207.89.182.107

1953-1954

deny

140

*

207.89.182.179

1953-1954

deny

141

*

207.89.182.198

1953-1954

deny

142

*

207.89.182.50

1953-1954

deny

143

*

207.89.182.143

1953-1954

deny

144

*

207.89.182.142

1953-1954

deny

145

*

207.89.182.17

1953-1954

deny

146

*

71.121.90.128/26 1953-1954

deny

147

*

71.121.90.184

1950

deny

148

*

71.121.90.191

1950

deny

149

*

207.89.182.37

1950

deny

150

*

207.89.176.14

1950

deny

151

*

207.89.182.57

1950

deny

152

*

207.89.182.61

1950

deny

153

*

207.89.182.41

1950

deny

154

*

207.89.182.27

1950

deny

155

*

207.89.182.26

1950

deny

156

*

207.89.171.57

1950

deny

157

*

207.89.182.251

1950

deny

158

*

207.89.182.250

1950

deny

159

*

207.89.170.190

1950

deny

160

*

207.89.174.60

1950

deny

161

*

207.89.179.185

1950

deny

162

*

207.89.182.248

1950

deny

163

*

207.89.182.107

1950

deny

continued on next page
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

164

*

207.89.182.179

1950

deny

165

*

207.89.182.198

1950

deny

166

*

207.89.182.50

1950

deny

167

*

207.89.182.143

1950

deny

168

*

207.89.182.142

1950

deny

169

*

207.89.182.17

1950

deny

170

*

71.121.90.128/26

1950

deny

171

*

71.121.90.184

1960

deny

172

*

71.121.90.191

1960

deny

173

*

207.89.182.37

1960

deny

174

*

207.89.176.14

1960

deny

175

*

207.89.182.57

1960

deny

176

*

207.89.182.61

1960

deny

177

*

207.89.182.41

1960

deny

178

*

207.89.182.27

1960

deny

179

*

207.89.182.26

1960

deny

180

*

207.89.171.57

1960

deny

181

*

207.89.182.251

1960

deny

182

*

207.89.182.250

1960

deny

183

*

207.89.170.190

1960

deny

184

*

207.89.174.60

1960

deny

185

*

207.89.179.185

1960

deny

186

*

207.89.182.107

1960

deny

187

*

207.89.182.179

1960

deny

188

*

207.89.182.198

1960

deny

continued on next page
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Table 5.3.: continued
No.

sIP

dIP

dPort

decision

189

*

207.89.182.50

1960

deny

190

*

207.89.182.143

1960

deny

191

*

207.89.182.142

1960

deny

192

*

207.89.182.17

1960

deny

193

*

71.121.90.128/26

1960

deny

194

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

22

allow

195

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

80

allow

196

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

443

allow

197

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

5800-5809

allow

198

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

5900-5909

allow

199

71.0.0.0/8

71.121.90.154

3690

allow

200

*

71.121.90.154

*

deny

201

71.0.0.0/8

*

*

allow

202

71.67.94.12

207.89.182.27

55555

allow

203

71.121.92.53

207.89.182.179

52311

allow

204

207.89.182.142

207.89.182.57

179

allow

205

207.89.182.143

207.89.182.57

179

allow

206

71.0.0.0/8

*

80

allow

207

71.121.88.50

207.89.182.17

52311

allow

208

71.121.59.54

207.89.182.17

52311

allow

209

*

*

*

deny

The FDDs to represent the 211-rule policy have sizes varying from 2, 500 nodes to
roughly 22, 000 nodes, depending on the order of the attributes. With the optimal attribute
order, the FDD for the given policy has more than 2, 500 nodes. Even though an FDD representation of a ﬁrewall policy can contain many more rules than its ACL counterpart due
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to the partition of the packet space, it has the innate advantage that the following query can
easily be calculated by a human user: Is a particular packet allowed by the ﬁrewall policy?
However, neither ACL nor FDD enables a human user to have a global understanding of
what the ﬁrewall policy achieves. This is highly relevant to the incremental management
of ﬁrewall policies.

5.3.3

Tri-Modularization Design

Our tri-modualization approach lies in the middle of the two extremes (i.e., ACL and
FDD) discussed above. It combines the advantage of partitioning the packet space by FDD
and the advantage of succinctness enjoyed by ACL due to allowing conﬂicts in the policy.
We will use the policy in Table 5.4–which is equivalent to that in Table 5.2—as an example
when explaining our design. The ﬁrst column in the table contains the rule numbers, to
allow us to refer to them in our discussion whereas the last column contains explanations
of rules or modules. We ignore the columns containing sPort and protocol as all rules in
the policy have a value of “*” (i.e., wildcard character) in these two ﬁelds. In the rest of
this Section, when we say lines XX, we refer to Table 5.4.
Primary attribute and primary modules. One natural approach to achieve isolation and
logical partitioning is to require each module to cover a disjoint subset of the possible
packets. Each packet is decided by one and only one such module. To ensure that a logical
global structure exists and that it is straightforward to ﬁgure out which module a packet
belongs to, we introduce the concept of primary attribute. In our approach, one can choose
either sIP or dIP as the “primary attribute”, and a policy is divided into modules in such
a way that each module covers a disjoint range for the primary attribute. We call such
modules primary modules. This is similar to partitioning in FDD but we restrict ourselves
to partition along the primary attribute only (see Figure 5.1).
Choice of primary attribute. Through analyzing real-world policies, we have found that
ﬁrewall policies essentially have three logical attributes: sIP, dIP, and service. The service is typically deﬁned by the protocol information (e.g., TCP, UDP, or ICMP) along with
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Table 5.4.: The modularized version of the example policy in Table 5.2

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Subroutine
sIP
dIP
dPort
decision Annotation
1
71.14.116.1
$ 1953-1954
allow
TM1
2 71.87.147.117 $ 1950-1951
allow
3 71.87.147.117 $
1960
allow
4 71.67.95.202
$
1960
allow
5
*
$ 1953-1954
deny
6
*
$
1950
deny
7
*
$
1960
deny
*
$
*
return
Main policy
sIP
dIP
dPort
decision
Annotation
71.100.64.0/19
*
*
deny
AM1
71.240.50.0/26
*
*
deny
71.206.182.0/24
*
*
deny
71.121.88.84
207.89.182.41
25
allow
PM1 with IP
207.89.182.41
71.121.92.96
207.89.182.41
25
allow
*
207.89.182.41
*
TM1
*
*
25
deny
AM2
*
*
137
deny
*
*
445
deny
*
*
135
deny
*
*
138
deny
PM2
*
207.89.182.248
*
TM1
with IP
207.89.182.248
*
207.89.182.57
*
TM1
PM3 with IP
207.89.182.142
207.89.182.57
179
207.89.182.57
allow
207.89.182.143
207.89.182.57
179
allow
*
71.121.90.128/26
*
TM1
PM4 with range
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
22
71.121.90.128/26
allow
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
80
allow
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
443
allow
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
5800-5809
allow
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
5900-5909
allow
71.0.0.0/8
71.121.90.154
3690
allow
*
71.121.90.154
*
deny
71.0.0.0/8
*
*
allow
AM3
*
*
*
deny
AM4
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_ _ __
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Range 1

1111111111
Rulelist

Fig. 5.1.: Design philosophy of our tri-modularization approach

dPort. The sPort of most rules is essentially “don’t care” (contains “*”). Using service as

the primary attribute, however, does not support a ﬂexible partitioning structure, because
even if one limits to a single service, there are often too many rules to make one primary
module difﬁcult to understand. We have further observed that the ideal primary attribute for
most policies is dIP, but some policies beneﬁt more from using sIP as the primary attribute.
Representing primary modules. Once the policy is partitioned into disjoint ranges of the
primary attribute value, our design exploits the succinctness of ACL due to conﬂicts
in the rules. There are 4 primary modules in Table 5.4, each of which covers one of
the disjoint ranges. PM1 (lines 11-13), PM2 (line 19) and PM3 (lines 20-22) cover
single IPs “207.89.182.41”, “207.89.182.248” and “207.89.182.57”, respectively. PM4
covers a range “71.121.90.128/26”, so it has rules relevant to “71.121.90.128/26” and
“71.121.90.154” in the primary attribute. Moreover, a primary module may consist of one
or more primary rules (primary rules cannot have “*” in the primary attribute ﬁeld) or instantiation rules (instantiation rules are relevant to calling template or auxiliary modules).
For example, line 13 is an instantiation rule for calling the template module TM1.
Auxiliary modules. One may desire a ﬁrewall policy to be fully partitioned into primary
modules. For example, a policy may be divided into modules each of which covers a
particular range for dIP. While this provides modularization, it can be undesirable, because
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there are often “global” rules that apply across all values in the primary attribute. For
example, one often wants to blacklist certain hosts, or block speciﬁc ports, etc. When
forcing all policies into primary modules, we have to duplicate these global policies in
each module. When these rules need to change, one has to make changes to every copy of
them. We call these rules that do not belong to any primary module “auxiliary rules”; they
can be easily identiﬁed because their primary attribute ﬁeld contains “*”.
We propose to group these auxiliary rules into what we call auxiliary modules based
on the types of the rules. For example, all adjacent rules that block all trafﬁc from some
subnet are considered to be in one auxiliary module. This enables one to abstract the
meaning of this module as “some source IPs are blacklisted here”, when trying to form a
global understanding of the policy, and dig into exactly which subnets are blacklisted only
when necessary. We encourage policy authors to move auxiliary rules of the same type to
be adjacent as much as possible, to reduce the number of auxiliary modules as much as
possible. Lines 8-10, 14-18, 31, and 32 are examples of auxiliary modules.
Template modules. In many large policies, a sequence of rules may apply to many different IP addresses (e.g., applicable to all webservers). To enable reuse, we allow a third
kind of module dubbed template modules. A template module consists of one or more
template rules that may be applied to many different IP addresses. For example, lines 17 form a template module, with “TM1” as its name. This template module is invoked in
lines 13, 19, 20, and 23 for IP addresses 207.89.182.41, 207.89.182.248, 207.89.182.57,
and 71.121.90.128/26, respectively. Template rules have their primary attribute ﬁeld being
“$”, indicating that this is a formal argument and can be instantiated when this template
module is invoked. Note that we use “$” instead of “*” to differentiate template rules from
auxiliary rules.
Putting it all together. As our modularization approach uses three kinds of modules,
we call it a tri-modularization design. The high-level idea of our approach is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. The primary attribute is partitioned into disjoint ranges each of which is
covered by one primary module. Each primary module is essentially an ACL, and may call
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auxiliary modules and template modules. Both auxiliary modules and template modules
are reusable, and they can be called by multiple primary modules.
In Table 5.4, there are 4 primary modules, 4 auxiliary modules, and 1 template module.
There are no interactions among primary modules, while there are some limited interactions
between primary modules and auxiliary/template modules. To evaluate a packet, one only
needs to look at the primary module that matches the packet, template modules called
by the primary module, and auxiliary modules, safely ignoring other primary modules.
For example, for a packet matching PM3, one may only check the following modules in
sequence: AM1, AM2, TM1, PM3, AM3, and AM4. The evaluation will stop whenever the
packet’s fate can be determined. Thus, a relevant slice of a policy can be easily computable
by a human in our design.

5.3.4

Deployability of Tri-Modularization

The next aspect of tri-modularization we investigate is its deployability. The relevant
questions in this regard are: How deployable the tri-modularization approach is? Can
existing ﬁrewall products support it? We observe that some existing products supporting
chains/subroutines, such as Linux netﬁlter/iptables can be used to implement the modules
we proposed, especially the reusable auxiliary modules and template modules.
In netﬁlter, a rule’s target can be a user-deﬁned chain. When a packet matches a rule
whose target is a user-deﬁned chain, the rules in the chain will be evaluated against the
packet. If the chain does not deny or allow the packet after it is traversed, the next rule in
the current chain will be evaluated. Therefore, users can deﬁne a new chain for either an
auxiliary module or a template module, and then write normal ACL rules whose target is
this chain and whose matching conditions are the input arguments when calling the chain.
In Table 5.4, we use similar syntax of chains in netﬁlter. TM1 can be viewed as a new
user-deﬁned chain. There are multiple places where this chain will be jumped to, such as
in PM1, PM2, PM3 and PM4. Take PM1 as an example, when the matching condition in
line 13 is satisﬁed, we will jump to TM1 and the rules there will be evaluated.
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5.4

Tri-Modularization of Legacy Policies
Although network administrators can easily use the concept of tri-modularization when

writing a new ﬁrewall policy, one of the main challenges of tri-modularization’s adaptability is the legacy policies. To convert legacy policies to their tri-modularized form and hence
enable adaptability, we present an automatic translation procedure, which at a high level
has the following steps.
1 Determining primary attribute: decide which ﬁeld (e.g., sIP, dIP) is used as the
primary attribute (PA).
2 Removing redundancies: identify and remove redundant rules.
3 Creating auxiliary modules: reorder the rules and assemble auxiliary rules of the
same type together.
4 Creating primary modules: generate a set of disjoint ranges of PA, each of which
will be covered by a primary module; reorder the rules and try to sort primary rules
based on the PA values, and then create suitable primary modules.
5 Creating template modules: identify frequent rule patterns in the policy and use
them to create template modules.
We have developed a tool dubbed ModFP which can help administrators perform the
above steps automatically. In the rest of the section, we describe the above steps and the
key algorithms.

5.4.1

Choosing the Primary Address

The main heuristic in choosing the primary attribute is that we want fewer rules where
the primary attribute value is a “*” so that there are fewer auxiliary rules. As primary
rules are partitioned into modules that are disjoint, they can be understood independently.
As a result, a policy that has many primary rules is not necessarily much more difﬁcult
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to understand. However, as auxiliary rules apply to all following primary rules (resp.,
modules), trying to decrease the number of auxiliary rules (resp., modules) can increase
the intellectual manageability of a policy signiﬁcantly.
Examining the policy in Table 5.2, we can see 25 rules have “*” in the sIP ﬁeld whereas
only 11 rules have “*” in the dIP ﬁeld. We thus choose dIP as the primary attribute.
We have observed that—for a dozen or so real-world policies we have converted to their
modularized format—dIP turns out to be a better choice as the primary attribute, likely
because most of the rules are controlling trafﬁc from outside the network to hosts inside
the network, and thus are better grouped by dIP. We also point out that one can always try
to modularize a policy ﬁrst with dIP as primary attribute, then with sIP or some other ﬁelds
as primary attribute, and compare the results.

5.4.2

Removing Redundant Rules

A rule is redundant in a policy when the policy accepts exactly the same set of packets
after the rule is removed. Our tool focuses on detecting and removing two kinds of redundant rules: shadowed and duplicated rules, which are similar to the deﬁnitions of upward
redundancy and downward redundancy introduced in [35]. However, we do not require a
special data structure like Firewall Decision Tree (FDT) for detecting redundancies.
Deﬁnition 5.4.1 (Shadowed rules) We say that a rule r j is shadowed by ri if ri appears
earlier in the policy than r j and is applicable to all packets that r j is applicable to. According to our deﬁnition, rule r j is redundant.
Take the policy in Table 5.2 for example, lines 62 63 and 66 68 are redundant rules,
since they are shadowed by line 61.
To deﬁne a duplicated rule, we ﬁrst introduce the notion of what it means for a rule to
be switchable with another rule.
Deﬁnition 5.4.2 (Switchable rules) For a given policy, we say that rules ri and r j are
switchable (or, ri can switch with r j ) if and only if ri and r j are two adjacent rules and
switching their order has no impact on the semantics of the policy.
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Two rules ri and r j are switchable if and only if either they have the same decision or
their sets of applicable packets are disjoint. When two rules have the same decision, they
are clearly switchable. When their sets of applicable packets are disjoint, they are clearly
switchable. When two rules have different decisions and their sets of applicable packets
overlap, if these two rules are the ﬁrst two rules in a policy, switching their order will
change the decisions on packets that they both are applicable to.
Deﬁnition 5.4.3 (Duplicated rules) We say that a rule ri is duplicated by r j if (1) r j appears later in the policy than ri ; (2) they have the same decision; (3) r j is applicable to all
packets that ri is applicable to; and (4) ri can switch with all rules that come between ri
and r j . According to our deﬁnition, rule ri is redundant.
For example, in Table 5.2, line 13 is redundant as it is duplicated to line 61. Any packet
it accepts will reach line 61 and is accepted. Also, lines 11 and 12 are duplicated to line 17,
since IP addresses 71.121.90.184 and 71.121.90.191 are in the subnet of 71.121.90.128/26.
A similar situation exists for lines 18

19, 24

25, 30

31, 36

37, 42

43, and 48

49.

Algorithm 2: Remove redundancies in a rule list
Input: An ACL rule list R
1 begin
2
foreach ri 2 R do
3
foreach r j 2 R such that r j appears after ri do
4
if ri ◆ r j then
5
Remove r j
6
else
7
if decision (ri )= decision (r j ) and ri is switchable with all rules
between ri and r j then
8
Remove ri

A rule may be redundant when it is neither shadowed nor duplicated. For instance, a
rule may be redundant because some packets it applies to are shadowed by another rule,
some other packets are shadowed by another rule, and the remaining packets will receive
the same decision by a rule that comes later. We have encountered very few examples of
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such cases in real-world policies. Algorithm 2 is used for detecting and removing shadowed
and duplicated rules.

5.4.3

Creating Auxiliary Modules

Recall that in a policy there may be “global” rules that do not belong to any speciﬁc
primary module and instead can apply across primary modules following them. We want
to assemble such auxiliary rules of the same type together to form auxiliary modules. This
will reduce the number of auxiliary modules, and also make auxiliary modules more manageable. For this purpose, we need to move rules around without changing the policy
semantics. We also want to move primary rules that are about the same IP addresses (or the
same preﬁx) together as much as possible to create primary modules, as described in the
next section. Therefore, we now introduce how to reorder rules.

Rule Reordering
To determine whether certain rules can be moved to be adjacent, we need to know to
what extent these rules can be moved around without changing the policy semantics. Given
a policy expressed as a list of rules R where each rule has an index, we use pre(r j ) to denote

the set of rules that should come before the rule r j , the rule with index j, when we move
the rules around. This set can be computed as follows. Going up from r j , ignore any rule

that is switchable with r j . When we reach the ﬁrst rule ri that is not switchable with r j , if
we want to further move r j up, we need to move ri together with r j , we thus add ri to our
set and now check whether they can be moved up together. More speciﬁcally, pre(r j ) can
be computed using Algorithm 3.
We can similarly deﬁne post(r j ), which is the set of rules that appear after r j such that
r j cannot be moved past them without changing the policy semantics. It can be calculated
using Algorithm 4.
For instance, according to the policy in Table 5.2, pre(r3 ) = ; (r3 refers to the rule in

line 3), pre(r6 ) = {r4 , r5 }, and post(r66 ) = {r69 }.
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Algorithm 3: Calculate pre(r j )
Input: A rule r j
1 s = {r j }
2 for i
j 1 to 0 do
3
if ri is not switchable with some rule in s then
4
Add ri to s
5

pre(r j ) = s \ {r j }

Algorithm 4: Calculate post(rule j )
Input: A rule r j
1 s = {r j }
2 for i
j + 1 to |R| 1 do
3
if ri is not switchable with some rule in s then
4
Add ri to s
5

post(r j ) = s \ {r j }
The deﬁnitions of pre(·) and post(·) for a rule can be generalized to a sequence to rules.

Given a sequence of rules R, pre(R) denotes the set of rules that should come before all the
rules in R, and post(R) denotes the set of rules that should come after all the rules in R.

Lemma 1 Given two sequences of rules R1 and R2 , where R1 appears earlier than R2 , they

can be merged together if there is no rule that belongs both to post(ri ) for some ri 2 S 1 and
to pre(r j ) for some r j 2 S 2 , i.e., post(R1 ) \ pre(R2 ) = ;.
Merging Auxiliary Rules
According to the primary attribute chosen by users, primary rules and auxiliary rules
can be distinguished. Recall that rules with the value of “*" in the primary attribute are
auxiliary rules. Further, auxiliary rules can be categorized into different types after the
primary attribute is set, see Table 5.5. “*” means that an auxiliary rule can take any values
in the ﬁeld, while “Speciﬁc” means that an auxiliary rule has a speciﬁc value in that ﬁeld,
such as a speciﬁc IP address, subnet, or service.
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Table 5.5.: Types of auxiliary rules (when dIP is the primary attribute)
Source IP
*
*
Speciﬁc
Speciﬁc
Speciﬁc
Speciﬁc
*
*

Service
Speciﬁc
Speciﬁc
*
*
Speciﬁc
Speciﬁc
*
*

Decision
allow
deny
allow
deny
allow
deny
allow
deny

Algorithm 5 can be applied to generate auxiliary modules based on their types. For
each auxiliary rule, we try to merge it with other auxiliary rules with the same type.
Algorithm 5: Creating auxiliary modules in R
Input: A rule set R
1 foreach ri 2 R do
2
if ri is an auxiliary rule then
3
Create an auxiliary module am with ri only
4
foreach r j after ri do
5
if r j is an auxiliary rule ^ri .type = r j .type then
6
if post(am) \ pre(r j ) = ; then
7
Merge r j into am

5.4.4

Creating Primary Modules

The objective of creating primary modules is to partition the policy into disjoint sections
such that each of the sections can be understood and managed independently with little to
no interaction with other portions of the policy. Each primary module contains rules that
cover a speciﬁc range of primary attribute values. The main challenge is to determine what
these disjoint ranges of primary attribute values are. Once such ranges are generated, the
next challenge is to group rules that fall into a speciﬁc interval together.
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Range Generation
Threshold of primary module size. The size of each primary module should not become
too large. For example, an administrator may want to have primary modules each of which
includes no more than � rules (e.g., 20). Therefore, users are required to set a threshold �
for how many rules can be in a primary module. If a primary module covering a range has
rules more than �, it means that the range should be further divided. However, in case a
range covers a single IP address and cannot be further divided, the above approach is not
applicable. In this case, the value of � should be increased to solve the problem. Therefore,
the value of � needs to be adjusted to the maximal size of primary modules covering single
IP addresses, if needed.
Generating ranges. Algorithm 6 is used to generated a set of disjoint ranges for a rule
set with auxiliary modules generated already. The initial input is a rule set and an empty
string meaning “*” (i.e., the whole range in the primary attribute). This algorithm uses a
tree structure, as show in Figure 5.2. The left child of a node is obtained by appending one
more bit “0” to the node, and the right child by appending “1” to the node. A node in the
tree represents either a single value or a range in the primary attribute. In Figure 5.2, since
the primary attribute is dIP, node A represents a single IP (32 one’s, i.e., 255.255.255.255).
Node B is “0” meaning that the ﬁrst bit of the total 32 bits is 0 and the other 31 bits can
be anything. This node hence represents a range [0, 2147483647]. Algorithm 6 uses the
following cost function as a utility function.
Given a rule set R and a range I, the cost function cost_func(R, I) outputs the number

of primary modules that are needed to cover the range I. cost_func(R, I) returns 1 if one

of the primary modules is required to have more than � number of rules while creating
primary modules to cover the range I. cost_func(R, I) returns n 2 N, otherwise.
Merging Primary Rules

After a set of disjoint ranges are obtained, we can create primary modules by merging
together primary rules overlapping with the same range. For each of the ranges, when
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Fig. 5.2.: The binary tree structure used for generating ranges
Algorithm 6: getRanges(R, root)
Input: A rule set R with auxiliary modules generated already, and a root range root
Output: A set of disjoint ranges ranges
1 list = ;
2 if root.length > num_o f _bits_in_primary_attr then
3
Return list
4 cost = cost_ f unc(R, root)
5 if cost < 1 then
6
if cost > 0 then
7
if left child’s cost equals to root’s cost then
8
list = list + getRanges(R, root + “0”)
9
else if right child’s cost equals to root’s cost then
10
list = list + getRanges(R, root + “1”)
11
else
12
Add root to list
13
Return list
14 else
15
list = list + getRanges(R, root + “0”)
16
list = list + getRanges(R, root + “1”)
17 Return list

the ﬁrst primary rule that is overlapping with the range is found, a primary module is
created having only this rule in it. After that, any primary rules that overlap with the range
will be appended to this primary module. When trying to move a primary rule into the
primary module, there may be primary rules, primary modules, and auxiliary modules lying
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between them. We can safely ignore those primary rules and primary modules because of
the beneﬁt of having disjoint ranges. For auxiliary modules that are switchable with the
primary rule to be inserted, we can safely ignore them as well. For other auxiliary modules,
however, we need to create instantiation rules for calling those auxiliary modules, put the
instantiation rules before the primary rule, and then append them together with the primary
rule to the primary module.
A primary rule is overlapping with a range, if the primary rule (1) equals to the range,
(2) is a subset of the range, (3) is a super set of the range, or (4) intersects with the range.
For the ﬁrst 2 cases, we just simply append the primary rule to the appropriate primary
module. For the last 2 cases, we only add the intersecting parts of the primary rule to
the appropriate primary module. In addition to that, we need to duplicate the rule for the
non-intersecting parts of the rule, and keep the duplicate rule(s) in the original rule’s place.

5.4.5

Creating Template Modules

In a policy, some rules may appear multiple times in a primary module or different
primary modules with distinct primary attribute values. We want to create templates for
those rules and form template modules so that they can be reused. The problem of creating
template modules has similarities with the role mining problem [85–88].

Frequent Rule Pattern Mining Problem
A list of similar primary rules may appear in multiple primary modules in a ﬁrewall
policy, or even appear in a primary module multiple times. We call such a list of rules a rule
pattern or just pattern. Note that primary rules that differ only in the primary attribute are
regarded as similar rules w.r.t. a pattern. Template modules can be instantiated by invoking
it with different values/ranges in the primary attribute ﬁeld. The notion of template module
is similar to the concept of subroutines in programming. Instantiation of a template module
is similar to subroutine invocation. We now state the frequent rule pattern mining problem.
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Deﬁnition 5.4.4 (Frequent rule pattern mining problem) Given a list of primary modules and an argument

min

that speciﬁes the minimum number of occurrences of a rule

pattern, the frequent rule pattern mining problem is to ﬁnd all rule patterns whose support
(i.e., the number of occurrences) is at least

min

from those primary modules. Such patterns

are called frequent rule patterns.
Frequent itemset mining algorithms like Apriori [89] can be applied for mining rule
patterns from primary modules. Each primary module is translated to a transaction, and
each rule in a primary module is an item. Again, primary rules that differ only in the
primary attribute ﬁeld are regarded as the same rule. In this way, we obtain the input for
our modiﬁed Apriori algorithm.
We modify the Apriori algorithm from the following two aspects. Firstly, items in an
itemset are order-insensitive in the original Apriori algorithm. However, rules in a pattern
are order-sensitive, and there may be other rules in between those rules in the pattern. In
our modiﬁed Apriori algorithm, whenever a potential frequent itemset (i.e., a pattern) is
found, we need to go back to the primary modules where the pattern appears and check if
the pattern can actually occur in those primary modules. For example, when a candidate
itemset {a, b, c} is found, we need to go back to a primary module where it appears to

check if its support should be increased. Assume that the primary module includes rules
{A, B, X, Y, C} (a A, b B, and c C are similar rules). The pattern {a, b, c} appearing in the

primary module as rules {A, B, C}. If rules {X, Y} in between the pattern can be moved away,
the support for the pattern will be increased; otherwise, the support will not be increased.

Secondly, in the original Apriori algorithm, an itemset in a transaction will be counted
only once even if it appears more than once in the transaction. Since a pattern may appear
in a primary module multiple times, and if a template module is created using this pattern,
the primary module should call the template module using an instantiation rule whenever
the pattern appears. For this purpose, in our modiﬁed Apriori algorithm, all occurrences
of an itemset in a transaction will contribute to its support. For example, assume that
a candidate itemset is {a, b, c}, and a primary module where it appears consists of rules
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0

0

0

{A, B, C, A , B , C }. This candidate appears twice, so its support should be increased by 2

instead of 1.

The value of

min

can be speciﬁed by users. For example, if the value is set to 3,

it means that a frequent itemset should appear at least 3 times (in different transactions
and/or within the same transaction). The value of

min

should not be too small or too large.

If it is too small, too many frequent itemset will be generated; if it is too large, perhaps no
frequent itemsets will be found. We modify the Apriori implementation in SPFM [90] for
our purpose.

Template Module Assignment Problem
Given the result of our modiﬁed Apriori algorithm which is a list of patterns with
lengths from 1 to k, where k is the length of the longest pattern(s) found, we want to
ﬁnd a subset of these patterns optimizing the number of rules reduced by creating template
modules for them. We ﬁrst deﬁne the assignment problem.
Deﬁnition 5.4.5 (Template module assignment problem) Variables xij is created for
each pair of a pattern Pi and a primary module PM j where the pattern appears. The
template module assignment problem is to assign either 0 or 1 to each of these variables,
with 1 meaning that the pattern should be used in the primary module and 0 meaning that
it should not, so that the total number of rules reduced by using the patterns assigned with
1’s will be maximal.
The number of rules reduced by using a given pattern Pi can be calculated using the
following formula: |Pi | ⇤ supi

|Pi |

supi , where |Pi | is length of the pattern, and supi is

the number of occurrences of Pi . The intuition behind the formula is that |Pi | ⇤ supi rules

can be saved, but some penalties also need to be deducted since an extra template module

with |Pi | rules and supi instantiation rules are created.

Using the longest pattern(s) will not always yield the optimal result. For example,

suppose that the longest pattern is P1 = {a, b, c, d, e, f } with sup1 = 3. However, there are
2 shorter patterns P2 = {a, b, c, d} with sup2 = 5 and P3 = {e, f } with sup3 = 4. Using
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patterns P2 and P3 together is better than using P1 only, since the number of rules reduced
is (4 ⇤ 5 4 5) + (2 ⇤ 4 2 4) = 13 in the former case instead of only 6 ⇤ 3 6 3 = 9 in the

latter case. Finding an optimal solution among the patterns found by our modiﬁed Apriori
algorithm is not trivial. We model the assignment problem as an integer programming
problem, and use IBM CPLEX optimizer [91] to solve the problem.
Suppose that m patterns (i.e., potential template modules to be created) are found. In
Figure 5.3, we show an optimizer model with 4 patterns and 3 primary modules. Each pattern is used by one or more primary modules. This information is obtained by the modiﬁed
Apriori algorithm mentioned above. Note that the support of a pattern may be different
from the number of primary modules where it occurs, since it may appear more than once
within a primary module. Each edge between a pattern and a primary module where it
appears is represented by a variable xij 2 {0, 1}. xij = 1 when pattern Pi will be eventually
used by primary module PM j , and xij = 0 otherwise. The goal of the optimizer is to ﬁnd

the assignments of those binary variables to optimize our objective function described in
Figure 5.4.

Fig. 5.3.: An optimizer model when m = 4

There are several constraints during the optimization. (1) ni is the actual number of
occurrences of the pattern Pi , and it should satisfy 0  ni  supi , where supi is the support
(i.e., the total number of occurrence) of Pi . If all values of xij ( j = 1 . . . k, where k is the
number of primary modules where Pi appears) is assigned to be 1, then ni = supi . If all
xij is assigned to be 0, then ni = 0. (2) h(ni ) is a function to decide whether a template
module should be created for pattern Pi . When ni = 0, it means that pattern Pi will not be
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m
X

maximize

i=1

subject to

ni =

ni ⇥ |Pi |
k
X
j=1

h(ni ) ⇥ |Pi |

ni

supij ⇥ xij , where xij 2 {0, 1}

0  ni  supi
8
>0 if n = 0
>
<
i
h(ni ) = >
>
:1 otherwise

0  x sj + xtj  1 for any pair of patterns that are
overlapping and co-exist in the same PM j
Fig. 5.4.: Formulation of template module assignment problem

used by any primary modules where it appears, h(ni ) = 0 so no template module will be
created for this pattern; otherwise h(ni ) = 1 so one template module will be created. (3)
A primary module can not simultaneously use patterns that are overlapping. Therefore, for
each primary module PM j , the constraint 0  x sj + xtj  1 should be satisﬁed, which means
that at most one of the overlapping patterns P s and Pt can be eventually used by PM j .

Generating Template Modules
A template module is created for each pattern Pi that is used by at least one primary
module (i.e., at least one variable xij for some j is assigned to be 1) such that the pattern
inside every primary module where it appears and for which the corresponding x value is 1
will be replaced by an instantiation rule. Moreover, a pattern may appear in a primary module multiple times, so each occurrence of the pattern will be replaced by an instantiation
rule accordingly.
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5.5

Evaluation
Using the tri-modualization approach, we implemented ModFP in Java, and used it to

examine a dozen or so real-world policies with sizes from dozens to hundreds. We show
the results of the 4 largest policies in Table 5.6, among which Policy 3 is the complete and
corrected version of the policy we presented in Table 5.2. Three of these policies belong
to an academic institution and have been used in prior work on ﬁrewall policies. The
remaining policy (i.e., Policy 3) belongs to a large-scale US-based IT company.
Table 5.6.: Experimental results of four real-world ﬁrewall policies

I
I

1
2
3
4

5.5.1

Modularized
Policy

ACL
Rules

Policy

I
I

42
87
211
661

I
I

PMs

AMs

4
8
17
20

3
6
4
3

I

TMs

Rules

1
1
10

15
88
66
494

I1
I

Translation time in seconds

I

I
I

Removing
Redundancy
0.046
0.183
0.294
0.551

Creating
AMs
0.005
0.017
0.048
0.089

I
I

Creating
PMs
0.084
0.120
0.226
0.251

I
I

Creating
TMs
0.121
0.138
1.356
18.460

I
I

ITotal
0.256
I

0.458
1.924
19.351

Effect on Number of Rules

By utilizing ModFP to convert Policy 1, Policy 3, and Policy 4 to their modularized
format, the number of rules is reduced by 64.3%, 68.7%, and 25.3%, respectively. For
Policy 2, the number of rules is increased by 1. For all policies, ModFP only take seconds
to convert them into the modularized form. For Policy 2, the number of rules increases
from 87 to 88 after the conversion because of the following reasons. First, there is only 1
redundant rule in the policy, so removing redundancies does not decrease the number of
rules much. Second, by creating a template module for a pattern with a length of 2 and
a support of 3, only 1 (= 2 ⇥ 3

2

3) rule is reduced. Third, 3 instantiation rules are

created when some rules are merged into the primary module they belong, since there are
3 auxiliary modules that are not switchable. Therefore, eventually the number of rules is
increased by 1.
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For Policy 4, the number of rules does not decrease dramatically like in the cases of
Policy 1 and Policy 3. After removing redundancies, the number of rules decreases from
661 to 572. After creating primary modules 24 rules are added, since a destination subnet
overlaps with multiple disjoint ranges, and the set of rules related to this subnet needs to
be duplicated. And then the number of rules decreases by 102 by using template modules.
Therefore, the number of rules decreases by 167 (i.e., 25.3%) in total.
Our tri-modualization approach enjoys additional advantages on top of reducing the
number of ACL rules.

5.5.2

Additional Advantages

Enabling a global understanding of a policy.

Several design features of our tri-

modualization approach aim at enabling a global understanding of a policy. Primary modules force one to group related rules together. Auxiliary modules group rules of the same
type together. With a policy in its modularized form, one can mentally partition a potentially very large number of rules into meaningful modules, to have a global mental picture
of the overall policy. One can hence provide a verbal summary of what the policy means
and attempt to reason about it.
For example, for the policy in Table 5.2, we came up with the summary below based
on its modularized form in Table 5.4. First, a list of source IPs are blacklisted. Then for
the host 107.89.182.41, beyond “TM1”, it also has port 25 open to two other hosts. “TM1”
allows trafﬁcs to ports 1950-1951, 1953-1954, and 1960 from some speciﬁc IPs, and otherwise blocks trafﬁc to ports 1950, 1953-1954, and 1960. Next “AM2" blocks ports 25,
135, 137, 138, and 445. Then the template “TM1” is applied to 3 other IP addresses and
subnets. For the host 207.89.182.248, only “TM1” is applied. For the host 207.89.182.57,
it has port 179 open to two hosts beyond “TM1”. Primary Module “PM4” covers the range
“71.121.90.128/26” , so subnet 71.121.90.128/26 and host 71.121.90.154 are covered by
this range. “TM1” applies to subnet 71.121.90.128/26. Host 71.121.90.154 is most special: trafﬁcs from 71.0.0.0/8 to ports 22, 80, 443, 3690, 5800-5809, and 5900-5909 are
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allowed, and everything else is blocked. Finally, everything from 71.0.0.0/8 is allowed,
and everything else is blocked.
We do not think it is feasible to come up with a similar description from the policy in
its original form.
Making policy errors easier to identify. The modular nature of policies makes policy
conﬁguration errors manifest themselves.
We have converted a dozen or so real-world ﬁrewall policies into their modularized
form using ModFP. For every large policy we have examined, we have found clear errors
as well as strange features that we conjecture to be errors. For the issues we have found
with the complete version of the policy in Table 5.2 (see Table 5.3 for the complete policy),
we have checked with the system administrator, and include the responses here as well.
There are a number of redundancies. For example, lines 202-203 and 206-208 are
shadowed by line 201. Line 41 can be removed, as any packet it accepts will reach line
201 and is accepted. Further, since IP addresses 71.121.90.184 and 71.121.90.191 are in
the subnet of 71.121.90.128/26, lines 27 and 28 can be removed because of line 50, and 12
other rules are in the same situation. The system administrator’s comment on this is that
“The overshadowing is likely due to the number of different people who have access to the
ﬁrewall policies.”
Less obvious issues can be found as well. Lines 27-193 in Table 5.3 correspond
to a template module. We found that we could not apply the template module to host
207.89.182.248 because two rules (line 1 and line 7 in Table 5.4) are missing. That is,
while lines 1-7 apply to 20+ other IP addresses, only lines 2-6 apply to 207.89.182.248.
We found this rather strange, since there is a rule blocking ports 1953-1954 for all trafﬁc,
but no rule allowing the ports for certain speciﬁc source hosts. And there is a rule allowing
port 1960 for certain speciﬁc source hosts, but no rule blocking it for all trafﬁc. The system administrator conﬁrms that this IP does not seem to be an active device in the DMZ
anymore, and this is likely the result of incomplete cleanup processes.
Another issue is with the template module itself. Overall the intention seems to be that
for ports 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, and 1960, only trafﬁc from a speciﬁc host is allowed, and
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trafﬁc from all other hosts is denied. However, line 2 in Table 5.4 allows port 1950-1951
trafﬁc from one speciﬁc host, but line 6 blocks only port 1950, and not 1951. A further
piece of evidence is that if this is indeed intended, then rule 2 needs to mention only 1950,
since as it is, port 1951 will be opened to all hosts in the 71.0.0.0/8 subnet according to
line 31. Missing 1951 in line 6 was also conﬁrmed to be an oversight. Some of the other
comments we have received from the system administrator are:
We don’t expend any effort to make the ﬁrewall rules easy to read or understand, and in
fact we don’t generally look at the entire set at all.
If we had software that made it easier to view the rule sets, and make changes to them
efﬁciently, then we would probably have a cleaner set of ﬁrewall rules.
Enabling piece-by-piece understanding of a policy. As primary modules cover disjoint
ranges, at most one primary module is applicable to each packet. Thus for each packet,
one can consider only the auxiliary and template modules (if any), and at most one primary
module. To understand the behavior of certain packets, one can quickly decide which
primary modules would be applicable and ignore the rest of the primary modules.
Enabling policy refactoring. Our approach enables policy refactoring in two ways. First,
template modules enable the deﬁnition of reusable templates that can be applied multiple
times, similar to reusable subroutines in programming. Second, when a primary module
becomes too large and complicated, one can divide it into multiple primary modules, each
covering a smaller range.

5.6

Conclusion
Utilizing the idea of modular programming and code refactoring, we have introduced

the tri-modularization design of ﬁrewall policies, which consists of three types of modules
(i.e., primary, auxiliary, and template). Our approach provides helpful abstraction and
makes the policy more understandable and manageable. It also naturally supports policy
refactoring in the authoring process. It can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of rules in a
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policy and can also make conﬁguration errors stand out and easier to identify. We present
algorithms for converting legacy ﬁrewall policies in ACL to their tri-modular form, and
also present a tool ModFP that automates the conversion. We have shown that using our
approach one can understand complex real-world policies as well as identifying subtle
errors, which are conﬁrmed by the system administrator.
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6. ANALYSIS OF SEANDROID POLICIES: COMBINING MAC
AND DAC IN ANDROID
Android has become a dominant computing platform, and its popularity has coincided with
a surge of malware. The incorporation of Security-Enhanced Linux in Android (SEAndroid) is an important security enhancement to the platform. While SEAndroid adds the
beneﬁts of mandatory protection that SELinux brought to desktops and servers, the protection is only as good as the policy. Existing Android devices contain a wide variety
of SEAndroid policies, depending on both the version of Android as well as the device
manufacturer. In this chapter, we present an approach to analyze SEAndroid policies in
conjunction with the underlying Linux/Unix Discretionary Access Control policies. We
apply our approach to four different versions of Android Open Source Project (AOSP) as
well as devices from seven different manufacturers, and ﬁnd several forms of unintentional
privilege assignments.

6.1

Introduction
The Android platform’s worldwide OS market share is now nearly equal to Microsoft

Windows [92]. Due to such popularity and its open-source nature, Android has received
signiﬁcant attention from academic and industrial security researchers. Much of existing
research into the security aspect of Android has focused on the middleware layer and its
permission system [4, 5]. However, the middleware is only one part of the Android platform. Android is built on top of the Linux kernel, with a collection of traditional and
customized Linux libraries and daemons. While permission misconﬁgurations may lead
to apps gaining additional capabilities (e.g., reading geographic location), lower-level policy misconﬁgurations may lead to persistent ﬁrmware modiﬁcations that compromise the
device integrity. Early versions of Android relied on Unix’s discretionary access control

94
(DAC) mechanism to protect daemon-speciﬁc resources as well as to isolate apps from
one another. However, Unix’s DAC mechanism has limited expressiveness; for example,
processes with the same effective user ID are treated the same way. Furthermore, DAC’s
discretionary nature allows inadvertent or malicious policy modiﬁcation that violates the
security goals of the system. Therefore, Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [6], which
adds mandatory access control (MAC), has been integrated into Android to harden the security of the lower layer of Android, resulting in SEAndroid [7].
SEAndroid is a port of SELinux to the Android platform. SEAndroid requires custom
policies as well as new reference monitor hooks (e.g., to add additional control into Android’s Binder Inter-process Communication mechanism). SEAndroid’s integration into
the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) has been an incremental process. SEAndroid
enforcement was ﬁrst adopted in Android version 4.4, but with a minimally restrictive
policy [8]. Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) such as Samsung and HTC have
devoted signiﬁcant resources to customizing and enhancing SEAndroid policy for their
devices. Through the efforts of these OEMs, the SEAndroid project, and Google, recent
versions of Android now contain large and complex SEAndroid policies.
The goal of our work is to better understand the MAC policies in Android. Different versions of Android and different OEMs have vastly different policy speciﬁcations.
One main challenge is that there is no ground truth of correctness, and hence there is no
clear “goodness” metric to evaluate a given policy. In this chapter, we propose to analyze
SEAndroid policies by identifying the following three classes of potential policy misconﬁgurations. (1) Compositional privilege escalation occurs when a subject gains elevated
privilege due to the interaction of multiple rules; that is, a subject gains more privileges
than the union of privileges granted through each rule. (2) Critical types accessed by lowprivileged domains occurs if a security-critical object type can be accessed (read and/or
write) by some low-privileged domain. (3) Coarse granularity of types occurs when objects belonging to the same type (and hence are protected the same way according to SEAndroid) have diverse protection needs that the least-privilege protection cannot be achieved
for all of them.
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Identifying the ﬁrst two classes of misconﬁgurations requires analyzing only the SEAndroid MAC policy. To identify types that are of coarse granularity, we need to also analyze
the DAC policy for ﬁles. Using these three classes of misconﬁgurations, we can also answer questions such as: (1) How have SEAndroid policies evolved, and are they becoming
more secure? and (2) Which parts of SEAndroid policies deserve to be carefully examined,
updated, and reﬁned?
We apply our approach of policy analysis to four versions of AOSP policies (4.4, 5.0,
5.1, and 6.0) as well as policies from seven different OEMs, and make the following observations. First, granting permissions to attributes (which group multiple domains/types
together) may unintentionally cause compositional privilege escalations. Policy writers
should be more careful when adding permissions, especially for attributes, since the added
permissions may be propagated to other domains/types with the attributes. Second, lowprivileged domains, such as untrusted_app and isolated_app, are currently allowed by the SEAndroid policies to read and write sensitive types such as sysfs and
selinuxfs. Special attention should be paid to check if such low-privileged domains
are over-privileged. Third, some types, such as system_data_file and sysfs, are
used for labelling objects that have different security needs. This results in many domains
being allowed to access those objects, violating the least privilege principle. In all AOSP
and OEM policies, we found examples of such policy misconﬁgurations.
This work makes the following contributions:
1. We propose to systematically analyze SEAndroid policies via three analysis problems
by focusing on identifying three classes of potential policy misconﬁgurations, including compositional privilege escalation, critical types accessed by low-privileged
domains, and coarse granularity of types. These analysis problems help identify concerns in SEAndroid policies and ways to enhance them.
2. We implement a semi-automated tool for applying our approach. The tool collects
necessary information, and identiﬁes instances of the three classes of policy misconﬁgurations we propose.
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3. We apply our approach to analyze SEAndroid policies across various Android versions and across different OEMs. Our ﬁndings can help policy writers better understand and customize SEAndroid policies.

6.2

Overview of Android Access Control Policy
In this section, we introduce the basic concepts of Android access control policy, and

the deﬁnitions we will use in later sections.

6.2.1

Android Access Control Policy

Android access control includes various layers, such as app permissions, middleware
MAC, Linux DAC, and kernel-level MAC (implemented in the SELinux LSM module).
In this work, we focus on analyzing DAC and kernel-level MAC1 policies, and refer to
them together as Android access control policy (AACP). In the following discussion, we
introduce the basic concepts of SELinux/SEAndroid and DAC, respectively.
SEAndroid is a port of SELinux with additional support for Android speciﬁc
mechanisms such as Binder IPC. SEAndroid supports three access control models:
type enforcement (TE) [9], role-based access control (RBAC) [10, 93], and multilevel security (MLS) [94], among which type enforcement is the primary policy
model. In SEAndroid, every subject or object has a security label in the format of
user:role:type:security_level. The ﬁrst element represents the user in SEAndroid, the second element role is for RBAC, the third element type is for TE,
and the last element security_level is for MLS. An example of security label is
u0:object_r:app_data_file:s0. In this work, we mainly consider type used in
TE as security label.
In TE, each subject (process) or object (e.g., ﬁles and sockets) is labeled with a type.
Subject types are also called domains. Types (or domains) can be grouped as attributes,
the usage of which forms a hierarchy. For instance, the appdomain attribute is assigned
1

We use MAC and SEAndroid interchangeably unless the context is ambiguous.

97
to app domains. Each object is also associated with one or more classes predeﬁned by
the system. A class can be regular ﬁle, directory, socket, block ﬁle, character device, etc.
Each class is associated with a ﬁxed set of permissions (e.g., read, write, open, and
execute), predeﬁned by the system.
TE uses allow rules to control subjects’ accesses to objects. An allow rule has the
following format.
allow Domain Type :
An

example

rule

is

Class { Permissions }

allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file :

file { read write } , which allows the domain untrusted_app to read and
write ﬁles of type system_app_data_file. Note that allow rules can also be deﬁned
using attributes.
SEAndroid includes important context ﬁles for labelling subjects and objects in the
system. One such ﬁle is file_contexts for labelling the ﬁle system, and another is
seapp_contexts for labelling processes and their related data.
DAC is the default access control model used by Linux, and thus by AACP. A ﬁle’s
access mode can be expressed using the following format.
file_type user_perms group_perms others_perms
File types can be “-” for regular ﬁle, “d” for directory, “c” for character ﬁle, “l” for link
ﬁle, “s” for socket, etc. We focus on regular ﬁles in this work, but our work is extensible
to other ﬁle types. Each ﬁle has three permission groups: user (i.e., what the owner can
do), group (i.e., what the group members can do), and others (i.e., what other users can
do). Each permission group has three characters that represent the read (r, or 4 as an
integer), write (w, or 2), and execute (x, or 1) permissions, respectively. Therefore, if a
ﬁle’s permission is set to “r--------” or 400, it means that only the owner of the ﬁle can read
it. Permission “rwxrwxrwx” or 777 means that the ﬁle can be read, written, and executed by
the ﬁle’s owner, any group members, and any other users. If a ﬁle can be read (or written,
respectively) by any other users, we say that it has global read permission (or global
write permission, respectively), or it is world-readable (or world-writable, respectively).
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6.2.2

Deﬁnitions

In the following, we formalize the basic concepts in AACP described above. We ﬁrst
deﬁne SEAndroid policy, which is similar to the deﬁnition in [81]. The difference is that
we also deﬁne attribute and its mapping.
Deﬁnition 6.2.1 (SEAndroid Policy) An

SEAndroid

policy

is

P MAC

=

(L s , Lo , ML , S , O, A, MA , R), where L s and Lo are the sets of security labels of subjects and objects, respectively; ML : L s [ Lo 7! S [ O is a mapping for assigning

security labels to subjects and objects; A = {a} is the set of attributes, s.t., A ⇢ L s [ Lo ;

MA : L s [ Lo 7! 2A is a mapping from security labels to their attribute set; R = {r} is a set

of SEAndroid policy rules (deﬁned below).

Note that, MA (l) = ; means that a security label l has no assigned attributes. An allow rule

r 2 R has the following deﬁnition.

Deﬁnition 6.2.2 (SEAndroid Policy Rule) An SEAndroid policy rule is a tuple r =
(l s , lo , cr , Pr ), where l s 2 L s is the subject security label (i.e., domain); lo 2 Lo is the object
security label (i.e., type); cr is the object class; and Pr is the permission set granted by r
when subjects with label l s access objects with label lo .
Next, we deﬁne the DAC policy and its related concepts.
Deﬁnition 6.2.3 (DAC Policy) A

DAC

policy

is

PDAC

=

(U s , Uo , MU , G s , Go , MG , S , O, AM, MAM ), where U s and Uo are the sets of UID/user
of subjects and objects, respectively; MU : U s [ Uo 7! S [ O is a mapping for assigning
UID/user to subjects/objects; G s and Go are the sets of GID/group of subjects and

objects, respectively; MG : G s [ Go 7! S [ O is a mapping for assigning GID/group

to subjects/objects; AM is the set of all possible access modes (deﬁned below); and
MAM : O 7! AM maps objects to their access mode.

Deﬁnition 6.2.4 (Access Mode) Access mode of an object is a tuple am

=

(ob ject_type, Puser , Pgroup , Pothers ), where ob ject_type is the type of the object, and Puser ,
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Pgroup , and Pothers are the permission sets allowed for the object’s owner, group members,
and others, respectively.

6.3

Our Approach for SEAndroid Policy Analysis
In this work, we propose an approach to systematically analyze the SEAndroid policy,

focusing on identifying potential policy misconﬁgurations. Our analysis framework is depicted in Figure 6.1. We ﬁrst collect DAC and MAC related data from different resources
in an Android phone. Then we perform three different analysis tasks, and generate analysis
reports. The ﬁrst two tasks use only the MAC policy, and the last one also utilizes the DAC
policy to aid the analysis of the MAC policy.
Data Collection

DAC & MAC Data

Systematic Analysis

- ---------------------------------------------- .
Compositional Privilege Escalation
~

''
'

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .,'

: Critical Types Accessed by Low-privileged Domains :
I••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• I

- ---------------------------------------------- .
Coarse Granularity of Types

~

''
'

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .,'

Analysis Reports

Fig. 6.1.: SEAndroid policy analysis framework

We point out that not all analysis results may cause actual problems (e.g., attacks). It
requires a great deal of domain knowlege to conﬁrm whether a potential policy misconﬁguration can be exploited in an attack. The main goal of our work is to highlight potential
problems in SEAndroid policies. The complexity and the large size of SEAndroid policies
make writing correct policies difﬁcult. Our approach can facilitate this process and help
policy engineers focus their efforts on potential problems. We believe that with input (e.g.,
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domain knowlege) from policy engineers, our approach can ease identiﬁcation of actual
problems in SEAndroid policies.

6.3.1

Three Analysis Problems

In the following, we describe three analysis problems, each of which identiﬁes a class
of policy misconﬁgurations.
A1: Compositional Privilege Escalation. For a domain and a type, the MAC policy may
grant permissions to the domain on ﬁles of the type in multiple allow rules, by (1) directly
to the domain or the type, and (2) through the domain’s or the type’s attributes. The combination of these rules may grant extra capabilities that are not permitted by any individual
rule, which may violate the original intention of the policy and cause privilege escalations.
Consider the following rule r1, which grants the read and write permissions to domain
d on ﬁles of type t.
r1: allow d t :

file { read write }

With r1, domain d can read and write a ﬁle of type t only when the ﬁle is opened already
(e.g., passed to it by binder IPC). Now, consider another rule r2 which grants open and
read to domain d via its attribute a.
r2: allow a t :

file { open read }

With r2 , the domain can only open and read the ﬁle, without other permitted actions.
However, the compound effect of these two rules is additionally granting the domain to
actively open and write the ﬁle, which is not allowed by r1 or r2 individually. We call
this problem as compositional privilege escalation. Before deﬁning the problem, we ﬁrst
introduce the concept of escalating permission set.
Deﬁnition 6.3.1 (Escalating Permission Set) An escalating permission set EPS consists
of a set of permissions that have a compound effect of escalating privilege.
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For the file object class, we deﬁne 2 EPS s: {read, open}, and {write, open}. More

EPS s (especially the ones for other object classes) are under further investigation. Now,
we deﬁne the problem of compositional privilege escalation.
0

0

0

Deﬁnition 6.3.2 (Compositional Privilege Escalation) Given P MAC , for any (l s , lo ), R =
0

0

0

0

0

0

{r|(r.l s = l s _ r.l s 2 MA (l s )) ^ (r.lo = lo _ r.lo 2 MA (lo ))}, and P = [r2R0 Pr . If |R |
0

2,

0

9EPS s.t. EPS ✓ P and EPS * Pr (8r 2 R ), then there may be a compositional privilege

escalation.

0

0

Put plainly, for all possible pairs of subject label l s and object label lo , Deﬁnition 6.3.2
0

0

ﬁnds all rules {r} that grant permissions to label l s on ﬁles of label lo directly, or grant
0

0

0

0

permissions via l s ’s attributes MA (l s ) or lo ’s attributes MA (lo ). If the number of rules found
is at least 2, and the permissions granted by these rules consist of any escalating permission

set EPS that is not included in the permission set Pr allowed by any individual rule r, then
a compositional privilege escalation may happen.
A2: Critical types accessed by low-privileged domains. There are domains that are
lower-privileged than others, such as domains untrusted_app and isolated_app.
Domain untrusted_app is for labeling any regular apps that do not have a speciﬁc
seinfo value based on their signatures. Domain isolated_app is a security label for
fully isolated sandboxed processes (e.g., a service component within an app runs under
such a special process that is isolated from the rest of the system and has no permissions of
its own [95]). We are interested in examining if these low-privileged domains are allowed
by MAC to access ﬁles with sensitive types like system_data_file. We deﬁne a set
of low-privileged domains LPD = {untrusted_app, isolated_app}, which are extensible to

include more domains. In the following, we also present examples of security-critical types

that we infer from the sensitivity of the ﬁles they are labeling.
sysfs

sysfs_writable

system_data_ﬁle

systemkeys_data_ﬁle apk_private_data_ﬁle

keystore_data_ﬁle efs_ﬁle

sysfs_bluetooth_writable system_app_data_ﬁle
keychain_data_ﬁle

backup_data_ﬁle

The analysis problem of critical types accessed by low-privileged domains has the following deﬁnition.
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Deﬁnition 6.3.3 (Critical Types Accessed by Low-privileged Domains) Given
P MAC , R
0

0

= {r|r.l s 2 LPD ^ ({read, open} ✓ Pr _ {write, open} ✓ Pr )}, and
0

0

Lo = {lo |lo = r.lo , 8r 2 R }. If Lo includes any security-critical types, then they can

be accessed by low-privileged domains.

A3: Coarse Granularity of Types. Some types, such as system_data_file and
sysfs, are overly used for labelling ﬁles. In this case, objects that have different security
needs are grouped together with the same security label, and more (possibly unnecessary)
permissions are granted to domains that are allowed to access this kinds of coarse-grained
types, violating the least privilege principle. We use the following two methods to identify
coarse-grained types.
Method 1. If ﬁles of the same security label belong to multiple users of different privilege levels, it may imply that the granularity of the type is coarse. For example, ﬁles of
type system_data_file may belong to users root, system, audio, and camera.
Obviously this type is overly used and can be reﬁned to more speciﬁc types. From our
observations in the analysis results, this problem may happen when the number of users
is equal to or larger than 3. We set the threshold to 3 rather than 2, because types belong
to 2 users including system or root may not be problematic. For example, some ﬁles
labeled as wifi_data_file are owned by the wifi user, while some others are owned
by system, which is ﬁne. The latter ﬁles may be created by a system user, and they
need to be accessed by the system user to let the system function correctly. To perform
the analysis, we extract pairs of user and type from ﬁle entries, and obtain type to user
mappings. Types that map to at least 3 users may be coarse-grained.
Deﬁnition 6.3.4 (Coarse Granularity of Types — Method 1) Given P = (P MAC , PDAC ),
0

0

0

0

0

for any object security label lo , O = ML (lo ) and U = {u|u = MU1 (o), 8o 2 O }, where MU1
0

is the inverse mapping of MU and maps objects to their users. If |U |

0

3, then lo may have

a coarse granularity.

Method 2. With method 1, we may be unable to ﬁnd coarse-grained types that are
associated with only one or two users. Many ﬁles belong to users system, root or both,
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and their types may have coarse granularity as well. Therefore, we propose method 2 to ﬁnd
more coarse-grained types. For ﬁle entries associated with the same (user, group, security
label) triple (e.g., (system, system, selinuxfs)), if some of them are accessible to
anyone (e.g., world-readable/world-writable) in DAC while some are not, there may exist
potential inconsistencies. These ﬁle entries have different global permissions in DAC, but
the same set of MAC rules will be applied to them since they have the same security label.
This also implies that the type is coarse-grained.
Deﬁnition 6.3.5 (Coarse Granularity of Types — Method 2) Given P = (P MAC , PDAC ),
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

for any (uo , go , lo ), O = MU (uo ) \ MG (go ) \ ML (lo ). If 9o1 2 O and o2 2 O , s.t.,
0

MAM (o1 ).Pothers = ; and MAM (o2 ).Pothers , ;, then the object security label lo may have

a coarse granularity.

6.3.2

Differential Analysis

Sometimes there are a plenty of results reported by the analysis tasks mentioned above,
and it is tedious and hard to manually check the correctness of all of them. AOSP incrementally modiﬁes SEAndroid policies over versions, and problems that exist in previous
versions may still exist in later versions. Therefore, for each analysis we generate a full
analysis report as well as a simpliﬁed analysis report that includes results not appearing
in previous versions. This reduces the efforts of checking analysis results when analyzing
various AOSP policies with our approach. Generating the simpliﬁed report is done by a
differential analysis: when analyzing the target policy Ptarget , results that are also reported
for the reference policy Pre f erence will be ignored. We also apply the differential analysis
to analyze various OEM policies. OEM policies customize the AOSP policy of the same
version (e.g., Android 5.0) for their own features by adding extra domains/types/rules, so
the problems that exist in the AOSP policy may still occur in the OEM policies. We can
use the AOSP policy as the reference when analyzing the target OEM policy.
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6.4

Data Collection
This section describes the information collected for analyzing DAC and MAC. Table 6.1

summarizes data collected from different resources in an Android phone.
Table 6.1.: Commands for collecting data from an Android phone
Data ﬁles
File entries

DAC

Allow rules
Neverallow rules

MAC

Context ﬁles
Attributes
Process info

6.4.1

Command
adb shell ls -aRZ
adb pull sepolicy
sesearch -A sepolicy
sesearch --neverallow policy.conf
adb pull seapp_contexts
adb pull file_contexts
seinfo -a -x sepolicy
adb shell ps -Z

DAC Related Data

To dump ﬁle entries for DAC permissions, we use the command “adb shell ls
-aRZ " from the root directory of an Android phone. Note that the phone must be rooted
to list the whole ﬁle system, otherwise only part of the ﬁle entries in the phone can be
obtained and thus the analysis results may be incomplete. We can get entries similar to the
following one.
File

DAC perms

User

Group

MAC security label

pubkey_blacklist.txt

-rw-r–r–

system

system

keychain_data_ﬁle

A ﬁle pubkey_blacklist.txt under the directory /data/misc/keychain/
has read and write permissions for its owner, read for its group members, and read
for all others, respectively. Its user and group are both system, and its security label is
keychain_data_file.
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6.4.2

MAC Related Data

MAC Rules. We pull the SEAndroid policy binary from an Android device through the
command “adb pull sepolicy”. Then we employ SETools [74] to recover rules
from the extracted binary with the command “sesearch -A sepolicy”2 . However,
it should be noted that using this approach, we can recover only rules of certain types (i.e.,
allow, auditallow, dontaudit, and type_transition), as the binary policy is essentially an ac-

cess control matrix specifying what permissions are allowed for subjects to access objects.
Note that we restrict our analysis only to allow rules (ignoring auditallow, dontaudit and
type_transition rules) because of the following reasons. An auditallow rule only audits an

access, and it still requires the corresponding allow rule to grant the access. A dontaudit
rule speciﬁes that the denial of an access will not be audited, as it is known that this access
always occurs and does not cause any real problems. A type_transition rule speciﬁes when
domain/type transitions are allowed, which is not directly related to the analysis tasks we
will perform.
In SEAndroid, neverallow rules are used to specify exceptions of allow rules, i.e., what
domains are never allowed to have what permissions on what types. From policy source
code, neverallow rules can be obtained with the command “sesearch --neverallow
policy.conf”, where the ﬁle policy.conf is the intermediate compilation result of
all SEAndroid source ﬁles.
Context Files.

To obtain the security labels of processes, we pull the con-

text ﬁle seapp_contexts from a device with the command “adb pull
2

SETools supports command line tools like sesearch and seinfo
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seapp_contexts”. Similarly, we obtain the security labels of ﬁle entries by pulling
file_contexts using the command “adb pull file_contexts”.
Attributes. We obtain attributes together with the (possibly empty) set of types associated
with each of them with the command “seinfo -a -x sepolicy”. The command
line tool seinfo is also provided by SETools.
Process Information. We obtain information of running processes in a phone with the
command “adb shell ps -Z”. The following is the information for /init which
runs as the root user in the init domain.
Security label User PID PPID Name
init
6.4.3

root

1

0

/init

Important Data Files

SEAndroid policies from different Android versions and different OEMs contain hundreds of domain and types, among which some are more interesting than others. We
create two extensible data ﬁles for storing sensitive types and domains, respectively.
They are useful to focus on analysis results of interests. A type is sensitive if it is security critical. For example, type system_data_file is more sensitive than type
app_data_file. A domain is considered as sensitive if it is low-privileged. For example, domain untrusted_app is more sensitive than domain system_app.

6.5

Analysis of AACP across Different AOSP Versions
In this section, we analyze AACP policies across different AOSP versions, and present

our ﬁndings.

6.5.1

Policies to Be Analyzed

We collected policy data from four AOSP versions (4.4, 5.0, 5.1, and 6.0). We ﬂashed
their user builds into a Nexus 5 phone, and obtained MAC related data. Recall that one

Table 6.2.: Statistics of SEAndroid policies from different Android versions
Android 4.4
Android 5.0
Android 5.1
Android 6.0
1
2

Types
279
428 (+53.4%)1
431 (+0.7%)
579 (+34.3%)

Domains
258
382 (+48.1%)
384 (+0.5%)
434 (+13.0%)

Attributes Allow rules
Neverallow rules2
21
1139
81060
21 (+0.0%) 4938 (+333.5%) 88299 (+8.9%)
21 (+0.0%) 4972 (+0.7%)
92702 (+5.0%)
23 (+9.5%) 4747 (-4.5%)
411873 (+344.3%)

Compared to its previous version
After expanding neverallow rules with special operators (e.g., “⇠”, “-”, and “⇤”)
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needs to be root to get information of the whole ﬁle system in a phone. Therefore,
we ﬂashed the userdebug builds of those Android versions into the Nexus 5 phone, and
obtained DAC related data.
Table 6.2 shows the statistics of the SEAndroid policies. Android 5.0, 5.1, and 6.0 add
53.4%, 0.7%, and 34.3% more types, and 48.1%, 0.5%, and 13.0% more domains, compared to Android 4.4, 5.0, and 5.1, respectively. Android 6.0 adds 9.5% more attributes,
while Android 5.0 and 5.1 keep the same number of attributes as their previous versions.
For allow rules, Android 5.0 adds 333.5% more rules, Android 5.1 slightly increases the
number of rules, and Android 6.0 reduces the number of rules. Android 4.4 has 81, 060
neverallow rules which restrict domains appdomain, domain, and netd. Android 5.0

and 5.1 add neverallow rules for restricting other domains such as untrusted_app,
system_server, and kernel. Android 6.0 dramatically increases the number of
neverallow rules compared to Android 5.1, due to the fact that a lot more domains and

types are added.
These statistics show that through the evolution of SEAndroid policies, Android 4.4 is
quite different from the later versions, and that the versions after Android 5.0 become more
stable, although Android 6.0 adds revisions due to new features like ﬁngerprint. Android
is shifting from enforcement on a limited set of crucial domains (e.g., installd, netd,
vold and zygote) in Android 4.4 to everything (more than 60 domains) since Android
5.0 [8]. These observations will be further proved by our detailed analyses discussed in the
rest of this section.

6.5.2

Compositional Privilege Escalation

For various AOSP policies, we checked if there are compositional privilege escalations
according to Deﬁnition 6.3.2. Table 6.3 presents examples found by our tool. The ﬁrst four
columns present domain, type, escalating permission set being checked, and example allow
rules, respectively. The last four columns show whether the problems exist in different
Android versions.

Table 6.3.: Examples of compositional privilege escalation in different AOSP policies
Domain
isolated_app,
untrusted_app

Type

EPS

Example Rules
allow appdomain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { execute open }2
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow netd proc : ﬁle { write }
allow domain proc : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }3
allow debuggerd system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { open }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow X1 sysfs : ﬁle { write }
allow domain sysfs : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow X proc_net : ﬁle { write }
allow domain proc_net : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow netmgrd proc_net : ﬁle { write }
allow domain proc_net : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow dex2oat dalvikcache_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { write }
allow domain dalvikcache_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow X shell_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow appdomain shell_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr write }
allow system_app wallpaper_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow appdomain wallpaper_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read write }

4.4

5.0

5.1

6.0

3

3

3

3

3

7

7

7

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

7

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

3

system_data_ﬁle

{read, open}

netd

proc

{write, open}

debuggerd

system_data_ﬁle

{read, open}

mpdecision, thermald,
netd, nfc, healthd

sysfs

{write, open}

netd, dhcp

proc_net

{write, open}

netmgrd

proc_net

{write, open}

dex2oat

dalvikcache_data_ﬁle

{write, open}

untrusted_app,
platform_app

shell_data_ﬁle

{write, open}

system_app

wallpaper_ﬁle

{write, open}

system_server

shared_relro, system_app, shell,
untrusted_app, platform_app, nfc,
isolated_app, radio, bluetooth

{write, open}

allow system_server appdomain : ﬁle { write }
allow system_server domain : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }

7

3

3

7

kernel

selinuxfs

{write, open}

allow kernel selinuxfs : ﬁle { write }
allow domain selinuxfs : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }

7

7

7

3

1
2
3

X represents any domain in that row
Permissions execmod and execute_no_trans are additionally added to the rule since Android 5.0.
r_file_perms is an AOSP pre-deﬁned macro which can be expanded to { getattr open read ioctl lock }.
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Finding 1.

Granting permissions to an attribute (e.g., domain and appdomain)

may unintentionally permit wider capabilities to domains/types assigned with the attribute.

For example, granting permissions to attribute domain may cause compo-

sitional permission escalations w.r.t.

EPS = {write, open}.

For some types (e.g.,

sysfs, dalvikcache_data_file, and proc), domain domain are allowed to have
r_file_perms on ﬁles of those types, i.e., domain are allowed to only read ﬁles. But
if a domain is assigned with attribute domain and is granted the write permission, the
combination of multiple allow rules will also permit it to open and write ﬁles. Note that
originally write is granted without open, which means that the domain is expected to
write ﬁles opened already. Such examples are found in all AOSP policies we analyzed.
Attribute appdomain has a similar problem.

In Android 5.0, domains

untrusted_app and platform_app are directly permitted to open and read ﬁles
of type shell_data_file. As app domains, they are granted write, meaning that
they can write ﬁles passed to them. The two rules together allow wider and unintentional permissions to the domains, which is a compositional permission escalation w.r.t.
to EPS = {write, open}. The comment “Long term, we don’t want apps probing into shell

data ﬁles.” in policy.conf conﬁrms that this is not something that policy writers want.

Observations.

From Table 6.3, we have the following observations.

First, some

of the problems remain the same in all Android versions, e.g., when the domain is
untrusted_app or isolated_app, and the type is system_data_file. The
problem in row 2 existing in Android 4.4 seems to have disappeared in later versions, when
the domain is netd and the type is proc. However, the problem still exists: type proc is
reﬁned to a more speciﬁc type proc_netd in later Android versions. Second, Some problems are brought into the policy since Android 5.0. This may be because that SEAndroid
becomes fully enforced as of Android 5.0 and thus more rules are added along the policy
evolution, increasing the possibility of potential bugs. Third, some problems appearing in
early versions are ﬁxed by later versions. For example, domain system_server cannot
open and write ﬁles of certain app domains (e.g., untrusted_app) in Android 6.0.
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6.5.3

Critical Types Accessed by Low-privileged Domains

Low-privileged domains may be allowed to access ﬁles of security-critical types. Table 6.4 shows such examples we found according to Deﬁnition 6.3.3. Note that we only
present results when both read and write permissions are granted due to space limitations, and there are more examples when only read or only write is allowed.
Table 6.4.: Examples of critical types accessed by low-privileged domains in different
AOSP policies
Type
sysfs, sysfs_writable,
download_ﬁle
dalvikcache_proﬁles_data_ﬁle,
selinuxfs, fuse
cache_ﬁle
Finding 2.

Domain
untrusted_app,
isolated_app
untrusted_app,
isolated_app
untrusted_app

4.4

5.0

5.1

6.0

3

7

7

7

7

3

3

3

7

3

3

3

We found examples of critical types accessed by low-privileged domains

in all Android versions. In Android 4.4, ﬁles of types sysfs and sysfs_writable
can be read and written by domains untrusted_app and isolated_app. These
ﬁles are usually owned by users root and system, so we consider them as critical ﬁles.

Since such ﬁles are allowed to be read and written by those low-

privileged domains, their security depends on the correctness of DAC conﬁgurations.
Since Android 5.0, ﬁles of types selinuxfs, fuse (i.e., Filesystem in Userspace),
dalvikcache_profiles_data_file and cache_file can be accessed by domain untrusted_app, and ﬁles of the ﬁrst three types can also be accessed by domain
isolated_app. Similarly, such ﬁles are usually owned by root and system users,
and hence are critical. If for certain reasons the low-privileged domains need to read and
write part of those ﬁles, the type of the ﬁles can be further reﬁned to avoid the case that the
low-privileged domains can access all ﬁles of the type.
Observations.

Sensitive types such as sysfs can be read and written by low-

privileged domains such as untrusted_app and isolated_app.
lem is ﬁxed in Android versions 5.0 and later.

This prob-

However, we also observed po-
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tentially problematic examples in later Android versions for other types such as
dalvikcache_profiles_data_file and selinuxfs. Note that the lists of sensitive types and low-privileged domains are extensible to include more sensitive types/domains. Coming up with more complete lists is a topic of our future work.

6.5.4

Coarse Granularity of Types

In the following, we use two methods to analyze the granularity of types.

Method 1
The ﬁrst method identiﬁes coarse-grained types belonging to multiple users, see Deﬁnition 6.3.4.
Finding 3.

Types, such as system_data_file and sysfs, are too coarse-grained

for labelling ﬁles. First, in Android 4.4, ﬁles whose owners are audio, camera,
media_rw and mediadrm, respectively, are all labeled as type system_data_file.
In later versions, these ﬁles are labeled as more concrete types audio_data_file,
camera_socket, media_rw_data_file, and media_data_file, respectively.
Second, type sysfs is overly used. In Android 4.4, most ﬁles under directory
/sys/ are labeled as type sysfs, while some are labeled as types sysfs_writable,
sysfs_nfc_power_writable, or sysfs_bluetooth_writable. Files of type
sysfs belong to 4 different users, which are root, system, bluetooth, and radio.
From Android 5.0, this type is reﬁned further to more types, as listed in Table 6.5. The ﬁrst
column shows the ﬁner-grained types derived from type sysfs, and the second column
shows the users of the associated ﬁles of the types. We can observe that ﬁles are relabeled
to new types according to their users. Comments in policy.conf show that AOSP
made efforts to reﬁne type sysfs. Nonetheless, it can be further reﬁned to support ﬁnergrained rules and to prevent violations of the least privilege principle. For example, domain
mediaserver is allowed to read and write ﬁles of type sysfs by MAC. There could be
a more speciﬁc type for such ﬁles. Actually because of the Stagefright exploits [96], start-

113
ing from Android 7 the mediaserver process is split into several new processes each of
which requires a much smaller set of permissions [97].
Table 6.5.: Finer-grained types of sysfs in Android 5.0
Type
sysfs
sysfs_devices_system_cpu
sysfs_lowmemorykiller
sysfs_mpdecision
sysfs_surfaceﬂinger
sysfs_bluetooth_writable
sysfs_rmnet
sysfs_smdcntl_open_timeout
sysfs_wake_lock
sysfs_nfc_power_writable

User
bluetooth, root, system
root, system
root
root
system
bluetooth
radio
radio
radio
nfc

From Table 6.5, we can also see that there are still ﬁles whose user is bluetooth
and type is sysfs (instead of sysfs_bluetooth_writable). Particularly, there
is one ﬁle labeled as sysfs_bluetooth_writable and another one ﬁle labeled as
sysfs, both of which are under the same directory. Either AOSP forgot to relabel the
latter ﬁle as type sysfs_bluetooth_writable, or a more speciﬁc label should be
created for it. Interestingly, AOSP chose to change the owner and the group of the ﬁle from
bluetooth to root in Android 7. This change seems unreasonable, since the ﬁle’s DAC
permissions are “-r--r--r--” (i.e., everyone can read it), and changing the owner/group from
bluetooth to root does not make any differences from DAC’s perspective.
In addition, ﬁles under /sys/devices/system/cpu should be labeled as type
sysfs_devices_system_cpu according to the context ﬁle file_contexts. But
for some reasons AOSP does not label all of them correctly, i.e., some ﬁles under the
directory are still labeled as type sysfs. The comments in policy.conf conﬁrm the
existence of this problem.

114
Method 2
The second method ﬁnds coarse-grained types associated with different global permissions in DAC, see Deﬁnition 6.3.5. Table 6.6 shows examples of types with different global
permissions in various Android versions. The ﬁle entries in the third column have global
permissions, while the ones in the fourth column do not allow any global accesses.
Finding 4. Types such as selinuxfs and debugfs may be too coarse-grained. Files
under /sys/fs/selinux are important SELinux related resources, and are labeled
as type selinuxfs. In Android 4.4, ﬁles /sys/fs/selinux/enforce (for storing enforcing mode) and /sys/fs/selinux/load (for storing the policy) have the
same owner, group and security label, which are system, system and selinuxfs,
respectively. The former ﬁle is world-readable while the latter is not, which implies that
selinuxfs is coarse-grained. From MAC’s perspective, these two ﬁles are both of type
selinuxfs, and hence the same set of MAC rules will be applied to them. For example,
the ﬁrst rule in Table 6.7 allows domain unconfineddomain (including high-privileged
domain kernel) to have all ﬁle permissions except entrypoint and relabelto on
ﬁles of type selinuxfs. At the same time, the second rule grants the same set of permissions to a low-privileged domain media_app.
We observed that since Android 5.0, the owner and group of the two ﬁles mentioned
above are changed from system to root. Actually the owner and group of all ﬁles of
type selinuxfs with system as both owner and group are changed to root in Android
5.0. This implies that these ﬁles are sensitive and should be only accessed by the root
users if they are not world-readable/world-writable. However, we noticed that MAC allows
low-privileged domains like untrusted_app and isolated_app to read and write
such ﬁles.
Observations. Coarse-grained types, such as sysfs and system_data_file, are
reﬁned to more speciﬁc types along the evolution of SEAndroid policies. However, there
is still room for improvements. For example, the granularity of types such as sysfs and

Table 6.6.: Examples of types with different global permissions in DAC in different AOSP policies

Android 4.4
Android 5.0

User, Group
system, system
root, root
root, root
system, system
root, root

Type
selinuxfs
selinuxfs
debugfs
system_data_ﬁle
selinuxfs

system, system

sysfs_devices_system_cpu

DAC (w/ global permissions)
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce -rw-r–r–
/sys/fs/selinux/user -rw-rw-rw/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace_marker –w–w–w/data/system/uiderrors.txt -rwxrwxr–
/sys/fs/selinux/enforce -rw-r–r–
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_min_freq -rw-rw-r–
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/cpufreq/scaling_max_freq -rw-rw-r–
/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/cpufreq/scaling_min_freq -rw-rw-r–

DAC (w/o global permissions)
/sys/fs/selinux/load -rw——/sys/fs/selinux/commit_pending_bools –w——/sys/kernel/debug/nohlt -rw——/data/system/packages.xml -rw-rw—/sys/fs/selinux/load -rw——/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpufreq/scaling_max_freq -rw-rw—-
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Table 6.7.: Example rules applied to ﬁles of type selinuxfs
allow unconfineddomain selinuxfs : file
{ all file permissions except entrypoint and relabelto }
allow media_app selinuxfs : file
{ all file permissions except entrypoint and relabelto }

selinuxfs can be further reﬁned. The analysis results from both methods show that our
approach can help ﬁnd such types.

6.5.5

Other Observations

During the analysis of different Android versions, we also made the following observations. First, granting permissions to attribute unconfineddomain may unintentionally permit more permissions to domains assigned with this attribute. In Android
4.4 more than 30 domains have almost all of ﬁle permissions on ﬁles of types such
as cache_file, device, and tmpfs. We found that these domains have a common attribute called unconfineddomain, which is assigned to 41 domains including
kernel, init, nfc, bluetooth, etc. Android 4.4 allows unconfineddomain
to have all ﬁle permissions except entrypoint and relabelto on ﬁles of types
fs_type, dev_type and file_type.

These three types are also attributes, so

any types with these attributes may be affected as well.

For example, since types

such as cache_file and system_data_file have the attribute file_type,
unconfineddomain can have most of the ﬁle permissions on these types. Android 5.0
and 5.1 drastically reduce the number of domains with attribute unconfineddomain
to three: kernel, init, and init_shell.

Also, these two Android versions

rewrite the too coarse-grained allow rules for unconfineddomain to access ﬁles of
types fs_type, dev_type and file_type, by excluding some sensitive types like
system_file and security_file from the allow rules. Android 6.0 completely
removes domain unconfineddomain and its related MAC rules. As a result, domain
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kernel is allowed to read only opened ﬁles of types cache_file, device, tmpfs
and system_data_file.
Domain unconfineddomain has special semantics in SEAndroid: it is used for
temporarily allowing permissive domains under the enforcing mode of SEAndroid policy,
and is expected to be removed after all domains are switched to the enforcing mode. This
is why we observed that this attribute is assigned to many domains and is granted many
permissions in Android 4.4 (in partially enforcing mode), and that it is reﬁned and then
completely removed in later Android versions (in fully enforcing mode).
Second, Android 6.0 excludes isolated_app, a domain assigned with attribute
appdomain, from the allow rule for allowing appdomain to read and write ﬁles of
type app_data_file. As a result, isolated_app is restricted to read and write ﬁles
opened already. This is related to the “isolated process” feature for sandboxing processes
in Android, which allows that a service component within an app runs under a special process that is isolated from the rest of the system and has no permissions of its own [95].
This observation is conﬁrmed by a new neverallow rule in Android 6.0 with a comment
“Isolated apps should not directly open app data ﬁles themselves”.

6.6

Analysis of AACP across Different OEMs
In this section, we analyze policies across different OEMs and present our ﬁndings.

6.6.1

Policies to Be Analyzed

We collected SEAndroid policies (Android 5.0) and related ﬁles of seven OEMs (Samsung, LG, HTC, Sony, Motorola, Huawei and Xiaomi) from Android Census [98], a website collecting conﬁguration information for Android installations. We also used the AOSP
policy (Android 5.0) as the reference policy. Table 6.8 shows the statistics of these policies. Among the OEMs, Samsung adds the most types, domains and attributes, while LG
adds the most allow rules. Since we do not have policy source code from OEMs, we could
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not obtain neverallow rules. In the following, we discuss the ﬁndings obtained from our
proposed analyses, with OEM names anonymized.

6.6.2

Compositional Privilege Escalation

For various OEM policies, we checked if there are compositional privilege escalations
according to Deﬁnition 6.3.2.
Finding 5. We found potential compositional permission escalations in all OEM policies,
see Table 6.9. The problem happens when multiple rules together grant domains with privileges (especially via the domains’ attributes) that none of the individual rule allows. For
instance, in the OEM1 policy, we found examples of compositional permission escalation
w.r.t. EPS = {write, open}, when the type is system_app_data_file, and the do-

main is untrusted_app. The untrusted_app domain is permitted to read and write
ﬁles of type system_app_data_file if the ﬁles are opened already. The domain is
also granted permissions to open and read (i.e., r_file_perms) such ﬁles through its
attributes appdomain and untrusteddomain. As a result, untrusted_app can
open and write the ﬁles as well, which is not permitted by any individual rule.

6.6.3

Critical Types Accessed by Low-privileged Domains

According to Deﬁnition 6.3.3, from various OEM policies we found examples showing
that low-privileged domains can access ﬁles of sensitive types, see Table 6.10. Due to
space limitations, we only show sensitive types that can be both read and written by lowprivileged domains.
Finding 6.

In OEM1’s policy, more than 200 types can be read and

written by domains filtered_untrusted_app, vpn_untrusted_app, and
untrusted_app, among which more than 20 can also be accessed by isolated_app.
Note that, all 185 types assigned with attribute tmpfs_file_type (i.e., types like
*_tmpfs) are involved. Similarly, in the policies of OEM2, OEM3, OEM4 and OEM6,

Table 6.8.: Statistics of SEAndroid policies (Android 5.0) from different OEMs
AOSP
Samsung S6 Edge
LG G3
HTC One M9
Sony Xperia Z3
Motorola Moto G
Huawei Honor 7
Xiaomi Mi 4i
1

Types
428
1201 (+180.6%)1
873 (+104.0%)
720 (+68.2%)
825 (+92.8%)
618 (+44.4%)
510 (+19.2%)
647 (+51.2%)

Domains
382
1047 (+174.1%)
760 (+99.0%)
658 (+72.3%)
735 (+92.4%)
555 (+45.3%)
440 (+15.2%)
586 (+53.4%)

Attributes
Allow rules
21
4938
158 (+652.4%) 14412 (+191.9%)
21 (+0.0%)
16235 (+228.8%)
21 (+0.0%)
8410 (+70.3%)
22 (+4.8%)
10053 (+103.6%)
21 (+0.0%)
9081 (+83.9%)
21 (+0.0%)
6138 (+24.3%)
21 (+0.0%)
7849 (+59.0%)

Compared to AOSP

119

Table 6.9.: Examples of compositional privilege escalation in different OEM policies
OEM

Domain

Type

EPS

Example Rules
allow X system_app_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read write }
allow appdomain system_app_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow untrusteddomain system_app_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
1

OEM1

OEM2

ﬁltered_untrusted_app,
llk_untrusted_app,
carrier_app,
untrusted_app,
vpn_untrusted_app

system_app_data_ﬁle

{write, open}

zygote_tmpfs,
otp_server_tmpfs,
system_server_tmpfs,
nfc_tmpfs,
sensors_tmpfs

allow X tmpfs_ﬁle_type : ﬁle { read write }
allow appdomain Y2 : ﬁle { read write }
allow untrusteddomain Y : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }

untrusted_app,
platform_app

radio_data_ﬁle

{read, open},
{write, open}

netd

sysfs_devices_system_cpu

{write, open}

system_data_ﬁle

{read, open}

device

{read, open}

system_data_ﬁle

{read, open}

enable_uninstall
apk_delete
logcat, logger
OEM3

OEM4

rild
smartcard

I If-------------display_color_calib

I l~------1
dalvikcache_data_ﬁle

charge_only

sysfs

OEM6

manufacture_app, radio

shell_data_ﬁle

{write, open}

OEM7

networkassistant

wallpaper_ﬁle

{write, open}

1
2

X represents any domain in that row
Y represents any type in that row

{write, open}
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am

OEM5

allow X radio_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { open }
allow appdomain radio_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read write }
allow netd sysfs_devices_system_cpu : ﬁle { write }
allow domain sysfs_devices_system_cpu : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow enable_uninstall system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { create open write }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow apk_delete system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { create open unlink write }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow X system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { append create open rename setattr }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow rild device : ﬁle { create getattr lock open unlink write }
allow domain device : ﬁle { read }
allow appdomain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { execmod execute
execute_no_trans open }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow display_color_calib system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { open }
allow domain system_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read }
allow am dalvikcache_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { write }
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { execute }
allow domain dalvikcache_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow charge_only sysfs : ﬁle { write }
allow domain sysfs : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow X shell_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow appdomain shell_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr write }
allow binderservicedomain shell_data_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr write }
allow networkassistant wallpaper_ﬁle : ﬁle { r_ﬁle_perms }
allow appdomain wallpaper_ﬁle : ﬁle { getattr read write }
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Table 6.10.: Examples of critical types accessed by low-privileged domains in different
OEM policies
OEM
OEM1
OEM2

OEM3

OEM4

OEM6

Type
*_tmpfs, system_app_data_ﬁle,
wallpaper_ﬁle, wiﬁ_efs_ﬁle,
radio_data_ﬁle
[OEM_name]_data_ﬁle, system_app_data_ﬁle
fota_data_ﬁle, sysfs_smd_mem,
sysfs_touch_keyguard
carrier_ﬁle, hprof_data_ﬁle,
vzwqualitylogger_ﬁle,
vzw_quality_ﬁle
mobicore_data_ﬁle
ecryptfs
[OEM_name]_smime_data_dir
sdcardfs
lru_pkgs_ﬁle, splash2_data_ﬁle

Domain
ﬁltered_untrusted_app
vpn_untrusted_app
untrusted_app
untrusted_app
isolated_app
untrusted_app
isolated_app
untrusted_app
untrusted_app
isolated_app
untrusted_app
untrusted_app
isolated_app
untrusted_app
untrusted_app

untrusted_app and isolated_app are allowed to access some sensitive types. For
the rest two OEMs, we did not ﬁnd any additional instances (i.e., only those inherited from
AOSP are found). It is worth noting that analyzing which critical types are permitted to be
accessed by which low-privileged domains in OEM policies is nontrivial. This is because
OEM policies add a large amount of new domains/types for enabling new features, and
it is not easy to identify and verify which types are critical and which domains are lowprivileged without ground truth and extensive domain knowlege. Side information may be
used to infer low-privileged domains. For example, the OEM1 policy has an attribute called
untrusteddomain, and thus the domains assigned with this attribute can be inferred as
untrusted and low-privileged.
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6.6.4

Coarse Granularity of Types

The two methods deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6.3.4 and Deﬁnition 6.3.5, respectively, are used
to analyze the coarse granularity of types in different OEM policies.

Method 1
The ﬁrst method identiﬁes a coarse-grained type by checking if it belongs to multiple
users. Table 6.11 shows the results for 2 OEM policies.
Table 6.11.: Examples of coarse-grained types in different OEM policies
OEM
OEM1
OEM3

Finding 7.

Type
sysfs
sysfs

User
bluetooth, radio, root, system
radio, root, system

The sysfs type is similarly coarse-grained in the policies of OEM1 and

OEM3, as detected in the AOSP policy. For the OEM1 policy, some ﬁles under directory
/sys/power/ belong to users bluetooth or radio, and thus can be labeled with
more speciﬁc types. For the OEM3 policy, it forgets to label the ﬁles wake_lock and
wake_unlock under directory /sys/power/ as type sysfs_wake_lock, while the
AOSP policy correctly labels them. Note that we did not detect results with this method for
the other OEM polices, but it does not mean that coarse-grained types are not introduced at
all by those OEMs. Our analysis results would be more complete with more ﬁles collected
from a phone.
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Method 2
We further analyzed OEM policies with method 2 to check if ﬁles associated with the
same (user, group, security label) triple have different global permissions. If that is the
case, these ﬁles may have a coarse-grained type.
Finding 8. We observed that OEM policies introduce similar coarse-grained types as the
AOSP policy. For example, system_data_file is used as a default label for ﬁles under the /data/ directory. Table 6.12 shows example DAC entries from different OEMs
that are labeled as system_data_file and have system as both of its owner and
group. Take the ﬁles from OEM2 for example. Everyone can read certain OEM Mobile
Device Management (MDM) ﬂag ﬁles under /data/system/, while only the owner of
/data/system/users/userlist.xml can read and write the ﬁle. From MAC’s
perspective, however, those ﬁles are all labeled as system_data_file and thus indistinguishable. The same set of MAC rules will be applied on them.

6.7

Conclusion
In this chapter, we identiﬁed three analysis problems to analyze and undersand SE-

Android policies, and provided a semi-automatic tool for ﬁnding potential problems in
policies. It is nontrivial to make the tool fully automatic since the policy analysis requires
extensive domain knowlege. We found potential problems in all four AOSP policies and
seven OEM policies we analyzed. Not all analysis results will cause actual attacks. However, our main goal is to help highlight the problem points within a policy.

Table 6.12.: Examples of types with different global permissions in DAC in different OEM policies
OEM

User, Group

Type

system, system

system_data_ﬁle

OEM1
OEM2
OEM3
OEM7

DAC (w/ global permissions)
/data/system/uidapn -rw-r–r–
/data/system/enterprise.conf -rw-r–r–
/data/system/[OEM_name]mdm_ir_ﬂag.txt -rw-r–r–
/data/system/[OEM_name]mdm_osupgrade_ﬂag.txt -rw-r–r–
/data/system/agree_SoftwareUpdate -rw-r–r–
/data/system/screen_state -rw-r–r–
/data/system/customized_icons/com.google.android.inputmethod.latin.png -rw-rw-r–
/data/system/ringtones/ringtone.mp3 -rw-r–r–

DAC (w/o global permissions)
/data/system/users/userlist.xml -rw——/data/system/gesture.key -rw——-
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7. SUMMARY
In this dissertation, we improve the policy speciﬁcations for three types of practical access
control systems (i.e., obligation systems, ﬁrewalls, and SEAndroid) from different aspects.
First, to improve the expressiveness of obligation policies for handling different types
of obligations in practical access control systems, we have proposed a language for specifying obligations by extending XACML. In this language, an obligation is modeled as a
state machine which communicates with the PEP and the external environment via events,
and includes rulesets to specify its responses to input events. This allows one to specify
sophisticated obligations. We have also introduced an architecture for handling access control policies with those obligations, extending XACML’s speciﬁcation and architecture. We
designed a simple yet extensible architecture which allows new types of obligation to be
included by adding new obligation modules. Based on SUN’s XACML implementation,
we implemented our design into a prototype system called ExtXACML for a speciﬁc application. Our prototype is extensible in that new obligation modules can be attached to
handle different types of obligations.
Second, to improve the comprehensibility of ﬁrewall policies for administrators to better understand and manage them, we have introduced the tri-modualization design of ﬁrewall policies, which consists of three types of modules (i.e., primary, auxiliary, and template). This tri-modualization approach provides helpful abstraction, and makes the policy
more understandable and manageable. It also naturally support policy refactoring in the authoring process. Other side effects are that it can sometime signiﬁcantly reduce the number
of rules in a policy, and that it can also make conﬁguration errors stand out and easier to
identify. Algorithms for converting ﬁrewall policies in ACL to their tri-modular form were
introduced, and ModFP, a tool that utilizes these algorithms to automate the conversion,
was developed. We have shown that using our proposed tri-modualization approach we are
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able to understand complex real-world policies as well as identifying subtle errors, which
are conﬁrmed by the system administrator.
Third, to improve the consistency of SEAndroid policies for reducing the attack surface, we have proposed to systematically analyze SEAndroid policies via three analysis
problems. We focused on identifying three classes of potential policy misconﬁgurations,
including compositional privilege escalation, critical types accessed by low-privileged domains, and coarse granularity of types. We combined the analyses of both MAC and DAC
policies, which help identify the problem areas in SEAndroid policies. We applied our
approach of policy analysis to four versions of AOSP policies (4.4, 5.0, 5.1, and 6.0) as
well as policies from seven different OEMs. In all AOSP and OEM policies, we found instances of the three classes of policy misconﬁgurations we identiﬁed. For example, granting permissions to attributes (e.g., domain and appdomain) may unintentionally cause
compositional privilege escalations. Our ﬁndings can help policy writers better understand
and customize SEAndroid policies.
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